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1. Introduction
Climate Change is the defining challenge of the 21st century. Measures taken today by politicians,
companies,  consumers,  and society in  general  will  directly  influence  earth's  habitability  in  the
decades to come. Through the complex interaction between GHG emissions, global warming, loss
of biodiversity, human health and well-being are at risk. While countries of the global north will
proportionally suffer less consequences than those of the global South, the projected damages will
still  be  grave.  In  recent  decades,  as  a  result,  environmental  protection  gained  an  increasing
relevance in international treaties, as well as national policies and legislature. 
The European Green Deal, first presented by the European Commission on the 11 th of December
2019,  is  at  the  moment  the  seemingly most  ambitious  strategy to  bring  forth  a  transformation
towards a more environmentally friendly society. Described by President Ursula von der Leyen as
Europe's  “man on the moon moment”,1 the EGD aims to achieve climate neutrality within the
European Union by 2050.  During  the years  to  come,  different  strategies  and measures  will  be
proposed to achieve the goals laid out by the deal. As such an undertaking could potentially result in
economic  changes,  which  threaten  the  livelihoods  of  anyone  employed  in  an  environmentally
harmful sector, the deal not only promises a “just transition”, but also continued economic growth
on the basis of a circular economy, where “growth is decoupled from resource use”.2 
The aim of the thesis at hand is to analyse the EGD, considering multiple perspectives. At its core,
the  analysis  will  be  guided  by the  question  of  how adequate  is  the  EGD in  dealing  with  the
challenges it faces and if the measures it contains will actually be able to achieve the goals it has set
out. This adequacy will mainly be analysed on a political level, as the deal itself only contains
suggestions  for  policies  that  should  be  realized  within  the  coming  years.  As  will  be  seen,
specifically the Commissions claim of striving for a “just transition” will be questioned again and
again. Furthermore, the question of how the Commission plans to realize its continental strategy
within a global eco-system and a globalized economy, and which kind of international interactions
the EGD's proposals hint at, will be investigated. All the while, the restricted competences of EU
institutions facing member states when drafting policies will be kept in mind. 
Additionally to the EGD, two documents will be analysed to lend further depth to its analysis and to
allow a deeper understanding of some of its political and economical implications. One will be the
“Circular Economy Action Plan For a cleaner and more competitive Europe”, the other one will be
the “Sustainable Europe Investment Plan”. The former document contains a strategy for pushing
1 Deutsche Welle, EU Lauds New Green Deal As Europe's 'Man On Moon Moment'.
2 European Green Deal, p. 2.
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European  economies  towards  more  circularity,  e.g.  recycling,  durability  of  end  products,  less
resource usage etc.  The concept  introduced in this  document is  central  for the EGD's claim of
decoupling growth from resource usage, and can therefore be seen as the economic paradigm that
the  Commission  wants  to  establish  as  the  guiding  principle  in  the  years  to  come.  The  latter
document proposes strategies for financing the green transition until 2030, and introduces the idea
of a “Just Transition Mechanism” that is supposed to support the economical transformation in
areas which still heavily rely on fossil fuel usage.
To follow through with the research goal presented above, the following structural approach will be
chosen:  After  giving  a  short  statement  on  the  effects  of  the  COVID-19 induced  challenges,  a
depiction will be given of how climate change is caused, which effects it will have on the global
environment and human life on earth, as well as how much the EU contributes to climate change.
Afterwards, a short overview of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement will be given. Both
sections  will  help  to  understand  what  challenges  the  EGD  has  to  address,  which  potential
catastrophes have to be prevented by environmental policies, and according to which international
self-commitments the Commission acts. These sections will be followed by an explanation of how
political competences are seperated and shared between EU institutions and member states, how the
EU budgeting process works, and which political implications these circumstances bring with them
in the context of fighting climate change.  Afterwards, the main part of this thesis follows, with an
analysis first and principally of the EGD, then the “Circular Economy Action Plan”, and lastly the
“Sustainable Investment Plan”.
Methodologically,  the analysis of the main documents will be accompanied and supported by a
diverse array of studies regarding renewable engergies, transportation, effects of circular economy
strategies etc., which have been published ever since the EGD was announced. Of equal importance
is  the  usage  of  statistics  regarding  the  share  of  renewables  in  European  energy  production,
production in farming, emission through transportation etc., which often times have been provided
by EU institutions. This should receive a critical mention, as it is indeed possible that some of these
statistics, for political reasons, might present a more positive reality, than would actually be the
case.  But since these statistics,  whenever  used,  prove the strategies presented by the EU to be
insufficient, this factor of uncertainty can be disregarded. Similarily, a critical approach has to be
taken when dealing with information taken from newspaper articles. Within this thesis, articles are
only used uncritically as a source of information, when the information itself did not contain an
assessment  or  judgement.  When quoting opinions,  the opinion giver  will  be named and,  when
necessary and possible, introduced. 
As the EGD was announced only relatively recently and is part of an ongoing political process,
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there exists no in-depth literature on it yet. As has been said, many scientific studies by researchers
of different backgrounds were used to address specific parts of the deal. For a basic understanding
of  climate  change and global  warming,  three authors  should be  mentioned specifically.  Firtsly,
Zambrano-González, who in his article “La Unión Europea ante la emergencia climática” sumarised
the climatical challenges and necessities the European Union is facing at the moment. Secondly,
Neukirchen and his anthology “Die Folgen des Klimawandels” have to be mentioned, as it conatins
contributions by a large set of climate experts, who explain the different mechanisms that promote
and contribute to climate change. Lastly, Wallace-Wells and his book “The Uninhabitable Earth”
have to mentioned. The author gives the most complete account of how climate change will affect
earth, though his work should be considered pop science. Therefore, the majority of information
extracted from his book will, whenever possible, be supplemented by more serious publications. 
Finally, to develop a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of the European Union Piris' ”The
Lisbon Treaty”, as well as de Gardebosc's and Mesdag's “The European Parliament’s Contribution
to the EU Budget” were indispensable. 
Three final points have to be made on citation. Firtsly, due to the pandemia, the books by Wallace-
Wells and Klein could only be obtained in the format of pdfs. As they were originally converted
from the ebook data format, the books do not give any indication of page numbers. The number
given in footnotes for these books therefore only correspondents with the page number of the pdf
document  and might  not  necessarily reflect  the  page  number  of  the physical  copies.  Secondly,
whenever a website has been quoted, the footnotes will only indicate a page number, if the website
itself  provided this  kind  of  separation.  Whenever  this  was not  the  case,  only the  name of  the
authors, as well as the pages title, are given in the footnotes. Thirdly, as every document analysed in
this thesis was authored by the Commission, only their titles and page number will be given in the
footnotes.  
2. Preface: COVID-19 and the Funding of the European Green Deal
It is impossible to already foresee how the COVID-19 pandemia will impact the EGD and what it's
economical effects will look like in general. But the Commission does not seem to stray away from
the  plan.  As  Vice  President  Frans  Timmermanns  declared,  investments  towards  economic
reconstruction  should  be  directed  towards  establishing  a  “green“  economy.3 For  this,  the  EGD
should serve as a framework.4 Therefore it seems, as if the virus will not have a negative influence
3 Timmermanns & Birol, Europa.
4 Ibid.
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on the deal's progress, even though it is too early to assess if it will have a positive effect or even
change the attitudes of member states regarding the restructuring of their economies. It should be
mentioned though that already in April, 17 ministers of member states suggested the deal to become
a “new growth stratgey“ for rebuilding the economy.5 Even Poland agreed that the restructuring of
global energy usage has to continue.6 It should be kept in mind though, that claims and demands
such as these might just as well be a strategy to more easily be granted funds of the future EU
financial  packages.  But generally it  can be assumed that at  least  the political  will  exists  to not
neglect the EGD and the fiscal resources necessary for it's realization despite the pandemia.
As of  now, August  2020,  the MFF for the time period of  2021 to 2027 seems to support  this
assumption,  although  a  final  conclusion  is  difficult.  Whereas  the  MFF  of  2014-2021  foresaw
spendings of up to 959.51 billion Euro,7 the coming MFF will consist of 1824.3 billion Euro, 750 of
which  are  part  of  the  Next  Generation  EU programme,  which  is  aimed  at  Europe's  economic
recovery.8 Thus, even after Brexit, the EU budget will be raised by more than 100 billion Euro. For
the Next Generation EU programme, the Commission vows to borrow 750 billion additional Euro
on behalf of the Union, which will be spent in the period of 2021-2024, and will be money that is
additional to the regular EU budget.9 It is difficult to say what the situation would look like without
a pandemia.  But  as the New Generation EU programme is  supposed to  offer a solution to the
COVID-19 induced economic downturn, it can be assumed that the MFF would have had a similar
scope, maybe a bit higher. Thus, budgetary and investment related analysis made within this thesis
should not be affected too much by the ongoing developments.  
3. Degradation of the Global Environment 
3.1 Impacts of Climate Change
The following pages will serve as an introduction to the mechanisms of how the greenhouse effect
is  produced  through  anthropogenic  actions,  how  it  will  result  in  climate  change  and  which
consequences these developments will have for earth's population until the end of the century. The
purpose  of  these  pages  is  to  give  a  brief  context  of  the  threats  which  have  to  be  anticipated,
alleviated and prevented by the EGD in the long term. The topic itself, of course, is too complicated
to be fully explained in brief and it would be futile to attempt so witihn the constraints of the paper
5 Bauchmüller & Beisel, Wiederaufbau.
6 Ibid.
7 European Council, Long-Term EU Budget 2014-2020.
8 European Council, Long-Term EU Budget 2021-2027.
9 European Commission, The EU Budget, p. 14.
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at hand. Therefore, a generalized approach has to suffice.  
Throughout earth's existence, the climate and the environment have experienced constant changes.
Different  gases  within the atmosphere and the natural  greenhouse effect  produced a  stable  and
sufficiently  warm environment,  that  allowed  the  occurence  of  life.10 But  the  disruption  of  this
delicate  system through anthropogenic  GHG emission  since  the  industrial  revolution  lead  to  a
dangerouly accelerated warming of the planet's climate.11 Before the atmosphere was filled with
manmade GHG, sunbeams penetrating earth's atmosphere were largely reflected back into space.12
With  more  and  more  GHG  in  the  atmosphere,  the  radiation  could  not  be  completly  reflected
anymore, the GHG absorbing the beam's infrared radiation, thus heating up the atmosphere, thus
warming the planet.13 The industrial revolution, the ever growing world economies, the widespread
usage of fossil fuel in cars and airplanes, industrial ainmal husbandry etc. contributed to increasing
amounts of gases such as carbon dioxide or methane trapping more and more heat emitted by the
sun between the planet's surface and the troposphere.14 As will be seen, only by the end of the 90s
the first international policies, in form of the Kyoto Protocol, were introduced to at least slow down
this process.
But GHG emission are only one way in which human's have augmented the greenhouse effect. The
reduction of natural carbon sinks, e.g. vegetation and oceans absorbing certain amounts of carbon
dioxide, additionally lowered the planet's capacity of regulating it's climate.15 Changes in rainfall
and  temperature,  as  well  as  the  acidification  of  the  oceans  lead  to  the  destruction  of  these
absorbational capacities.16 Similarly, deforestation, whose role has been disregarded for a long time,
contributed considerably to the destabilization of the greenhouse effect.17
The  question  of  global  warming  caused  through  emissions  though  is  the  most  significant.
Anthropogenic warming of the planet already resulted in the intensification and quantification of
weather extremes, such as the growing number of hurricanes on the US's east coast or longer lasting
periods of drought in Mediterranean regions.18 As of late, the Paris Agreement asks it's signators to
pursue strategies of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees, and if that is not possible to at least 2
degrees  compared  to  the  period  before  the  industrial  revolution.  According  to  the  World
Meteorological Organisation, a warming of 1 degree was inrevisibly reached in 2015.19 There are
10 Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 433.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 434.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 435.
15 Anderson & Alice, Climate Change, p. 3865.
16 Ibid.; Boyle, Climate Change, p. 172.
17 Ibid., p. 3868.
18 Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 430.; Schrader, Die wichtigsten Jahre, p. 2.
19 Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 3.
8
indications  that  it  is  already too late  to  keep global  warming below or  even at  the 1.5 degree
benchmark.20 The UN estimated, that if govnernments, economies, and consumers would continue
undisturbed, a warming of 1.5 degrees would already be reached by 2040, maybe even 2030.21
Current strategies by states all around the world to reduce their emission until 2030 will even lead
to an increase of  3  degrees  in  the long run,22 whereas  it  would  be necessary to  reduce global
emissions  by 45% in  2030  compared  to  2010,  and  ultimately  to  zero  emissions  by  2050.23 A
reduction of  emissions  by 50% by 2050 would be sufficient  to  reach the 2 degree threshold.24
Sticking  to  this  objective  would  already lead  to  unbearable  conditions  in  countries,  which  are
economically struggling.25
A report by the IPCC suggests that even though consequences of an increase by 1.5 degrees in
global temperatures would already be dangerous to humans and the environment in general, they
would still be vastly prefarable, to effects expected under the 2 degree scenario. Not only would
extreme weather conditions, such as heat waves, droughts, heavy rain or floods become even more
prevelant.26 But the rise of sea levels would also be reduced by 10 centimeters, preventing hundreds
of millions of people living in coastal areas in the developing world from losing their homes and
having  to  migrate.27 About  150  million  people  would  be  prevented  from  dieing  through  air
pollution.28 An increase by 2 degrees might lead to water scarcity for 400 million people, cities
close to the equator will become unlivable due to heat and in northern regions, thousands might die
during heat waves in summer.29 It should be kept in mind that the global environment is a complex
and heavily interconnected system, and that climate change will not unfold in a linear way, where
cause and effect can easily be established.30 Rather,  by crossing certain tipping points,  such as
methane being be released through the melting of arctic ice or glaciers in the Himalaya retreating,
reflecting even less sunlight back into space, feedback loops will be created, contributing even more
to the accelaration of the greenhouse effect.31 Many of these tipping points are said to be reached at
around a 2 degree increase.32 
If world temperatures were to further increase by 3 degrees, as a continuation of the current trend in
20 Ibid.; Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 4.
21 Schrader, Die wichtigsten Jahre, p. 2; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 49.
22 Ibid., p. 2f.
23 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 38; Schrader, Die wichtigsten Jahre, p. 3.
24 Anderson & Alice, Climate Change, p. 3863.
25 Anderson & Alice, Climate Change, p. 3863, Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 4.
26 Schrader, Die wichtigsten Jahre, p. 2; Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 3.
27 Ibid., p. 3.
28 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 34.
29 Ibid. p. 18.
30 Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 3.
31 Ibid., p. 4f.
32 Ibid., p. 3.; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 18.
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emissions  indicates,  earth's  ice  sheets  would  eventually  melt  completly,  raising  sea  levels  in  a
degree that would inundate hundreds of cities, such as Hong Kong, Miami, or Dhaka, as well as
lead to permanent droughts in southern Europe.33 
A closer look should be taken at how all these phenomena are connected to each other, at how a rise
in global temperatures will lead to a rise in sea levels, the disturbance of the jet stream and thereby
to an acceleration in the frequency of extreme weather conditions. It seems obvious, that through a
rise of temperatures, the presence of polar ice would be reduced in some way. Since temperatures
are  not  evenly  distributed  around  the  planet,  an  apparently  minor  rise  of  the  average  global
temperature  by 1.5  degrees  might  translate  to  a  rise  of  temperatures  in  the  Artic  areas  by 13
degrees.34 Estimates from 2003 indicated that by the end of the century, Arctic areas would be ice
free during summer time.35 These estimates had to be revised. Artic ice seems to be melting faster
than expected, with a threefold acceleration of the thawing right just in the last decade, making it
more likely that already in 2040 ice free summers would occure in the Arctic.36 125.000 years ago,
temperatures were similar to what is expected by 2040 in those Arctic areas, while sea levels were
between four and six meters higher.37 Supposing a similar rise in sea levels can be expected in the
future, cities like New York, London, Venice, or Shanghai would be flooded in the long run.38 These
processes take a comparably long time to come into full effect though. At the moment, scientists
estimate that thawing of glaciers and arctic areas contribute to rises in sea levels of 3 millimeters
per year.39 But already these small changes, which will add up to a rise in global sea levels by 10 to
20 centimeters in 2050,40 will lead to an increase of extreme flooding in coastal areas in Europe,
increasing damages and costs  suffered trhough these floodings by a factor of 20 until  the year
2100.41 
The rise of sea levels, however, is not the only threat posed by the melting of ice caps around the
world. On the one hand, there will be a reduction of the albedo effect, according to which ice is
capable of reflecting sunlight back into space, thus lessening it's capacity of warming the planet.42
Accordingly, the less ice there is in the Arctic, the more sunlight will be absorbed by the planet. On
the  other  hand,  the  melting  of  permafrost  will  potentially  accelerate  the  greenhouse  effect.
Permafrost in the Arctic areas of Canada or Siberia, contains organic materials. Not only does the
33 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 18.
34 Ibid., p. 68.
35 Francis, Auf dünnem Eis, p. 98.
36 Ibid.; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 66.
37 Francis, Auf dünnem Eis, p. 100.
38 Ibid.
39 Witze, Flut, p. 220.
40 Ibid., p. 229.
41 Ibid., p. 220.
42 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 69.
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thawing of the permafrost, which is already taking place, result in damages to local infrastructure
and the local biosphere, but it would also lead to the accesability of these organic materials by
bacteria that would start digesting it, leading to a massive increase of methane and carbon dioxide
exhaustion in these areas.43 The amount of potential GHG held by permafrost is double the amount
of GHG already within the atmosphere.44 It is difficult to predict how these processes will further
affect  climate  change,  since  only  in  recent  years  scientists  have  started  to  pay  attention  to
permafrost.45 
The rise of global temperatures, the retreat of arctic ice and rising sea levels also influence the jet
stream.46 Under  pre-industrial  conditions,  the  difference  in  temperature  between  polar  and
equatorial regions produce air currents in the atmosphere, the jet stream.47 Since polar regions are
warming faster than the rest of the planet, the stream is destabilized, creating meanders that remain
in place for weeks, which results in situations of extreme weather.48 These meanders sometimes are
cut off from the jet stream and will not move away from a certain region due to the cut off.49 Thus, a
meander containing mainly hot air might incapsulate a region for weeks, producing droughts and
heat-waves,  or,  in case of  cold air,  extreme frost,  and depending on water-saturation,  flooding,
inundations and rain for days on end.50 These processes have existed before the onset of global
warming,  but  have  intensified  and  become  more  and  more  prevelant,  the  closer  temperatures
between polar and tropical  regions have gotten.51 Changes in the jet  stream already resulted in
massive floods hitting the European west-coast during the past decades, the absence of winters in
central Europe, or the outbreak of draughts, heat waves and forest fires during the summer of 2003,
which killed 35000 Europeans, or the summer of 2018.52
Heat waves are projected to become regular occurrences in Central and Eastern Europe.53 Cities and
East European countries, which have lower adaptive capacities than West Europe, will especially
suffer.54 Combined with an aging population, who is even more vulnerable to high temperatures,
extreme heat will pose a grave threat to public health.55 Additionally, heat waves will lower people's
productive capabilities by increasing their proneness to exhaustion, as well as their vulnerability to
43 Francis, Auf dünnem Eis, p. 102.
44 Ibid.; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 68.
45 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 69.
46 Francis, Auf dünnem Eis, p. 100 and 103.
47 Lingenhöhl, Jetstream, p. 182.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 186.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 187.
52 Ibid., p. 190.; Ronˇcák, Hlavˇcová,  Kohnová et. al., Impacts of Future Climate Change, p. 280; Wallace-Wells, 
Uninhabitable Earth, p. 23 and 44.




heat strokes.56 Impairments of coordination and cognitive ability are also to be expected, next to
emotional outbursts of anger due to physical discomfort in a heated environment.57 Droughts and
heat in the Mediterranean area will lead to a loss of biodiversity, a higher risk of forest fires, and the
severe disruption of the agricultural sector.58 Additionally, the agricultural sector will not only suffer
the loss of fertile land and crop yield, but also a decreased quality of life for it's animals through
heat stress, resulting in a reduced quality of animal products, such as dairy.59 The agricultural sector
though is a major contributor to climate change itself, already in 2005 being responsible for GHG
emissions of 7%.60 
The availability of freshwater poses an additional threat. Between 70 and 80% of freshwater are
globally used for agricultur, while between 10 and 20% are used for industrial purposes.61 Already,
250 million people in Africa suffer from water scarcity.62 By 2030, global demand is expected to
outstrip watersupply by 40%, which will especially affect dry, hot areas, which often correlate with
the areas, where an increase in population is expected.63 At the same time, water demand from the
agircultual sector is  expected to increase by 50% in the next three decades.64 All  these factors,
combined with a projected growth of the world's population by 50% until the end of the century,
pose complex questions about food and water security.65 Next to freshwater, oceans will also suffer
severely from climate change. Currently, oceans have mitigated climate change by absorbing 30%
of anthropogenic GHG emissions and 90% of excess heat caused by global warming, which in turn
lead to their acidification and to the rise of their temperatures.66 This, obviously, results in enormous
damages to marine biodiversity. 
Shortages in food and water will, in the long-term lead to a growing numer of climate refugees, who
will migrate to regions where they hope to find suffierent resources, leading to quarrels over these
scarce ressources.67 Generally,  the world population's  poorest  40%, which is  around 2.6 billion
people, will suffer the most from climate change.68 According to the Stern Review, climate change
threatens to not over prevent the realization of the UN Millenium Development Goals, put to also
reverse human devolpment in India or South East Asia, if the 2 degree mark is hit. 69 These areas run
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 430.
59 Gaulyl & Ammer, Challenges p. 196-199.
60 Owen & Silver, Greenhouse gas, p. 545.
61 Ibid., p. 88. 
62 Ibid., p. 89.
63 Ibid., p. 88. 
64 Ibid., p. 93f.
65 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 53 and 59.
66 Boyle, Climate Change, p. 172.; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 97.
67 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 29.
68 McInerney-Lankford, Darrow & Rajamani, Human Rights, p. 1.
69 Ibid.
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the risk of suffering losses of 9 to 13 % of their GDP by 2100 compared to a non climate change
scenario,  a  bigger  loss  than  would  occure  if  the  Western  financial  system  collapsed.70 Other
estimates surrounding the economic development of poor countries foresee annual losses of 2.5 %
of their GDP, which will accumulate to losses of around 400 billion US dollars during the next
twenty years.
The spaces, in which all of the factors mentioned above, will present themselves the most, are cities.
Cities are the highest contributers to climate change, consuming more than two-thirds of globally
produced energy and producing more than 70% of the world's GHG emission, consuming around
75% of natural resources,  and producing 50% of global waste.71 Since 1950, urban populations
experienced a sevenfold increase, especially in low- and middle income countries, with estimates
predicting that two-thirds of the world's population will live in cities by 2050.72 By 2018, already
55.3% of the worlds population inhabited cities.73 Due to cities's structural and architectural layout,
with asphalt and concrete absorbing heat during the day and emitting it during the night, as well as a
high density of cars emitting carbon dioxide, deaths caused by environmental harm and climate
change are growing larger.74 High water consumption in cities will lead to reductions of freshwater
availability and put a strain local agricultural production.75 Additionally, three quarters of all larger
cities are, according to the UN, located on coasts, and therefore especially vulnerable to floods and
rising sea levels.76 
3.2 Threats to Human Health
Next  to  changing  the  climate,  augmenting  the  occurence  of  natural  disasters,  leading  to  the
depletion of vital resources, the destruction of the environment also cause detrimental damages to
human health. The deadly effects of long lasting periods of heat have already been mentioned. But
climate change and GHG emissions already take a heavy toll on public health in more direct ways.
Not only does pollution lead to the death of 10,000 people daily, but also adversly affects cognitive
performance,  and  childbirth.77 Diseases  casued  by  air  pollution  are,  among  others,  chronic
respiratory diseases like asthma, higher blood pressure, strokes, and heart diseases.78 Cognitively,
70 Ibid.
71 Juhola & Boyd, Adaptive climate change, p. 1235; Baran, Circular Economy, p. 34.
72 Moser & Satterthwaite, Pro-Poor Adaption, p. 231; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 51.
73 Baran, Circular Economy, p. 34.
74 Moser & Satterthwaite, Pro-Poor Adaption, p. 231; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 50; Juhola & Boyd, 
Adaptive climate change, p. 1235.
75 Moser & Satterthwaite, Pro-Poor Adaption, p. 235.
76 Juhola & Boyd, Adaptive climate change, p. 1235.
77 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 102.
78 Ibid., p. 104.
13
pollution is linked to worse memory performance, attention spans, vocabulary development, and to
hindering neuronal development in general.79 Restructuring the energy sector to be purley reliant on
renewable energy could prevent 430000 annual deaths in the EU alone.80 Apart from air pollution,
microplasitics pose another threat, as they have been found in fish, beer, honey, or sea salt, and has
already  proven  to  be  toxic  to  marine  animal  populations.81 Additionally,  exposure  to  weather
extremes,  such  as  heat  waves,  droughts,  storms  or  forest  fires,  will  negatively  impact  human
health.82 Changing  temperatures  will  also  facilitate  the  spread  of  infectious  diseases  into  new
areas.83 Accroding to estimates by the UNFCCC, by 2030 there will be 113 million additional cases
of diarrhoeal diseases, as well as 17,4 Million additional cases of malaria.84 Because in some areas
of the world, climate will become warmer and wetter, mosquitoes and tsetse flies, bringing with
them malaria, dengue and yellow fever, will spread to new areas of the world.  Livestock is also
threatened by these developments. An example of this is the spread of the Culicoides imicola, a
mosquitoe species that migrated first into the Mediterranean countries and then further north due to
warming temperatures, spreading tropical diseases, such as the bluetonque virus, to livestock.85
Accessability  to  drinking  water,  the  provision  of  sufficient  nutritious  food  or  secure  living
environments are jeopardised by climate change as well.86 Even though these areas specifically
might not pose a direct problem to countries in the EU in the decades to come, they will contribute
to social and political instability in other parts of the world, leading to increased migration. 
One major threat to public health, that might not seem very grave at first, is the potential spread of
allergens  and  increase  in  pollen  allergies.  In  Europe,  pollen  allergies  and  allergic  asthma  are
estimated to affect around 40% of the population and to have lead to health spendings between 55
to 151 billion € in 2013.87 By 2041 to 2060, sensitization to allergens such as ragweed will have
double from 33 million to 77 million people, mainly affecting countries such as Germany, France or
Poland.88 Controll of the growth and spread of similar weeds therefore has to be ensured.89
Another risk to European health stems from the spread of vector-borne diseases,  such as lyme
disease, which is transmitted through ticks, whose abundance has grown due to climate change and
who will spread further into northern Europe under certain climate conditions.90 Since there exists
79 Ibid.
80 Haines & Scheelbeck, European Green Deal, p. 1327.
81 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 106.
82 Hunt & Khosla, Climate Change, p. 243.
83 Ibid.
84 Hunt & Khosla, Climate Change, p. 244.
85 Chevalier, Courtin, Guis et. al., Climate Change, p. 99.
86 Ibid., p. 242.
87 Lake, Jones, Agnew et al., Pollen Allergy,  p. 385.
88 Inid., p. 390.
89 Ibid.
90 Li, Gilbert, Vanwambeke et. al., Lyme Disease, p. 1. Though these conditions are very complicated to untangle. Not 
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no vaccine for  lyme disease,  prevention depends on “risk communication,  rapid diagnosis,  and
personal protection measures”.91
Lastly, more indirect factors will also affect public health adversely. Due to rising levels of CO2 in
the atmosphere, sugar production in plants is on the rise. This, in turn, negatively influences the
share of nutritious content, such as protein, calcium, iron, or vitamin C, in fruits, vegetables and
plants.92
3.3 European Contribution to Climate Change
Before going into the details of the EGD, it seems sensible to take a short look at the EU's current
status in regard of GHG emissions. In 2018, the EU's emitted a total of 3893 million tonnes of
GHG, which, compared to the level of 1990 is a reduction of 21%.93 This leaves a further reduction
of 34% compared to 1990, to reach the EGD's goal of a 55% reduction by 2030. Following the
trajectory before the announcement of the EGD would put the EU at a reduction of 46% by 2030.94
The contribution of different sectors to the 2018 emissions can be attributed as follows: Fossil fuel
usage  was  responsible  for  53%  of  emissions,  transportation,  including  aviation,  for  25%,  the
agricultural sector for 10%, industrial processes and product usage for 9%, and waste management
for 3%.95 A large part of emissions in these sectors is directly or indirectly produced by households,
i.e.  non-commercial  and  non-political  actors.  Globally,  households  contribute  72%  to  GHG
emission, of which transportation and food consumption made up 64%, making policies reducing
emissions in these areas all the more relevant.96
Even though GHG emissions are the most prevalent and most pressing stressor for the environment,
they are not the only factor. Usage of resources and materials and the resulting waste production,
e.g. in the form of microplastics, pose an additional threat. Considerations regarding this area will
be especially relevant to this paper later on, when discussing the Commission's plans for a circular
economy, that aims at reintegrating waste into the economy, thus lowering resources usage, and by
extension  the  energy used in  their  extraction,  as  well  as  production  of  waste.  This  step seems
inevitable in striving to preserve the environment, as in the year 2017 globally 92.1 billion tonnes of
only is lyme disease not always amplified through high temperatures but also is also stunted by factors such as 
deforestation. This, however, does not negate the need for preventitive measures. cf. Li, Gilbert, Vanwambeke et. al.,
Lyme Disease, p. 10
91 Li, Gilbert, Vanwambeke et. al., Lyme Disease, p. 1.
92 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 61.
93 Eurostat, Greenhouse gas, p. 1f.
94 Jäger-Waldau, Kougias, Taylor et al., Photovoltaics, p. 6.
95 Eurostat, Greenhouse gas, p. 4.
96 Dubois, Sovacool, Aall et al., It starts at home, p. 145 and 152.
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resources were used, a number that will increase annually due to the growing world population.97 Of
these materials, 80% will be disposed again, whereas wastage in food consumption lies at around
30%.98 Daily, inhabitants of European cities produce 2.1 kg of waste.99
A last factor should be mentioned. As has already been pointed out, urbanisation is expected to
grow even more during the next decades. Houses, streets and other infrastructure require concrete to
be build.  The concrete  industry currently emits  2.8 billion tons  of  carbon dioxide  per  year,  or
between 4 to 8% of global CO2 emission.100 The expansion of infrastructure, spearheaded by China,
India, and Indonesia puts the construction sector on track of emitting 470 gigatonnes of carbon
dioxide by 2050.101 During it's production, concrete also makes up a tenth of the world's industrial
water use, adding to water scarcity in dry areas of the world.102 This poses the question of how to
accommodate additional billions of people in cities and how the construction sector and city design
can be reshaped to reduce environmental destruction, a question that is further complicated by the
fact that the production of concrete is less costly economically and ecologically than it's alternatives
e.g. steel or wood.103 
4. Key Points of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement
In the next section, a quick explanation will be given of important aspects established by the Kyoto
Protocol and the Paris Agreement, as they establish a frame of reference wherin the EU situates its
environmental policies.
With the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 the UNFCCC introduced the first legal framework under which
the international community could collectively address climate change concerns, building the basis
for the reduction of GHG emission and the support of national adaptation efforts.104 Countries were
categorized by GHG emission and received a corresponding responsibility to reduce their emissions
by  a  certain  amount.105 Thus,  richer  countries  were  attributed  more  responsibility  in  reducing
emissions than poorer countries.106 Furthermore, the threshold of a two degree Celsius rise in global
temperatures was established as a limit that would lead to global catastrophes, such as the flooding
97 Baran, Circular Economy, p. 32.
98 Sverko Grdic, Nizic & Rudan, Circular Economy, p. 1.
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of cities and the normalization of extreme weather, if it were to be crossed.107 The protocol was
adopted  by  187  states  and  became  legally  binding  in  2005.108 Obligations  included  emission
reduction targets for industrialised countries during the first commitment period of 2008 to 2012.109
Another commitment period from 2013 to 2020 was agreed upon at the COP in Doha in 2012.110 
In 2007, to contribute to it's emission reduction commitments in the frame of the Kyoto Protocol,
the European Council adopted an action plan for the energy sector, that would become influential
for the EU's energy politics.111 The plan's objectives lay in creating a international alliance among
industrialised nations to reduce global GHG emissions by 30% in 2020.112 For the second Kyoto
period,  the  EU committed  to  raise  the  percentage  of  renewable  energy production  to  20% by
2020.113 Despite the Protocol's widespread support, global emissions during the past 20 years grew
rapidly.114 Yet climate change also remained a major international concern. 
In 2015, during the second phase of the Kyoto commitments and just before the Paris Agreement,
the  UN set  a  number  of   “Sustainable  Development  Goals”,  including the  preservation  of  the
climate, biodiversity, water resources and urging the international community to finally take action
in mitigating climate change and its consequences.115 Some details of these goals will be discussed
further while analysing the EGD.
After long discussions in the frame of the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement was negotiated by the end
of 2015 and legally came into force on the 4th of November 2016.116 The agreement stated, that
global warming should be kept below 2 °C or possibly 1,5 °C, for which every country has to
prepare national contributions.117 It further promoted low carbon emission development, by placing
importance on international cooperation.118 Each country, rich or poor, has to contribute to GHG
emission reduction, the capability for which has to be determined by each country individually.119
Therefore, developing countries like China and India, the world's biggest and third biggest GHG
emitters  respectively,  are  no  longer  exempt  from contributions  as  they  were  under  the  Kyoto
Protocol.120 
One  problem  remained:  The  agreement  was  far  from  being  legally  binding  and  was  not
107 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 14f.
108 McInerney-Lankford, Darrow & Rajamani, Human Rights, p. 3.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.p. 4.
111 Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 437.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., p. 438.
114 Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 15; Boyle, Climate Change, p. 172.
115 Boyle, Climate Change, p. 173.
116 Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 3f.
117 Boyle, Climate Change, p. 174; Reynolds, Giverning, p. 285; Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 431.




accompanied by a system of sanctioning if states failed to contribute to GHG emission reduction.
Instead,  it's  language  remained  flexible  and  emphasized  the  voluntary  character  of  the
contributions.121 Since the Paris Agreement does not attribute different responsibilities to different
polluters like the Kyoto Protocol, e.g. historically strong polluters having to reduce emission more
rigorously than historically low polluters, poor countries are not only forced into a position were
they have less room to develop their economies, but it also reinforces existing asymmetries in the
distribution of wealth and political power.122 Furthermore, since the global economic model is build
on competition and growth, which are tied to and translated into geopolitical power, it is unlikely
that  any country will,  in  the future,  adopt  any measures  which will  disproportionally harm it's
position on the world stage.123 
Nevertheless,  in  response  to  the  agreement's  ratification,  the  EU  has  positioned  itself  as  the
international leader in questions of climate change resilience and sustainability,  and is trying to
promote  the  importance  of  these  ideas  on  an  international  stage  and  among  the  European
populace.124
5. Competences of the European Institutions and the drafting of the MFF
In order to fully understand under which capacities the EGD can and has to operate, it is necessary
to give a short introduction into the legal framework outlined by the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty on
the European Union, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which coordinate
and  regulate  the  legislative,  executive  and  fiscal  comepetences  of  the  European  institutions.
Especially relevant to the case of the EGD are the division of competences among the EU and it's
member states, the Multiannual Financial Framework, as well as the annual budgetary decisions.
Taking a look at this framework reveals that the EU can potentially encourage and steer a common
legislature towards reaching the goals set  out in the EGD. But the member states through their
competences and through influencing fiscal legislature via the European Council and their MEPs
maintain certain political powers that should not be underestimated.
Article 2 of the TFEU recognizes three main competences that are divided between the EU an it's
member states: exclusive competences, for which only the EU has the power to introduce binding
legislation,  shared  competences,  where  both  the  EU  and  the  member  states  can  adopt  legally
binding measures, as long as the national legislature does not interfere with EU legistlature, and
121 Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 432.
122 Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 5.
123 Ibid., p. 6.
124 Zambrano-González, Unión Europea, p. 432.
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finally supporting competences, where the EU is allowed to act in a supporting, coordinating role,
but cannot introduce it's own legislation.125 
The matter of exclusive and supporting competences are relatively easy to summarize. The area of
exclusive competences mainly concerns economical questions, such as the customs union, the EU's
internal  market  rules,  the  eurozone  policy,  or  common  commercial  policies.126 Supporting
competences additionally encompass improvement and protection of human health, industry and
tourism.127 Areas relevant to the EGD covered by shared competences are environmental policies,
legislature regarding agriculture and fishery, transportation, energy, and common concerns of public
health concerns.128 For the energy sector it can be further said that measures can only be adopted
through qualified majority voting and in co-decision.129 The TFEU protects further autonomies of
the member states in this question. For one, member states retain the right to determine how they
want to exploit their sources of energy, as well as which sources of energy they want to use.130
Finally,  the TFEU stresses  the importance of  solidarity between member states in  questions  of
energy, allowing the Council to adopt measures appropriate to a countries economical situation.131
This  accentuation  of  solidarity  stems  from requests  by Poland  and the  Baltic  countries.132 The
member states, therefore still command a considerable amount of autonomy in an area that is key to
mitigating the climate crisis. This might proof problematic in the future, considering that coal still
play an important role in the energy sector of countries such as Germany or Poland. 
Generally  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  realization  of  the  EGD's  goals  in  regard  to  the  EU
competences heavily depends on the compliance and cooperation of the member states with the EU-
institutions. But the competences are not the only level on which the single member states have the
option to influence EU legislation. 
Another important tool is the Multiannual Financial Framework, whose scope is layed out in Article
312 of the TFEU. For a period of seven years, the MFF regulates the EU's annual budgets and
establishes a mandatory ceiling for spending.133 The MFF has to be agreed upon unanimously by the
Council and has to be approved by the EP with a qualified majority.134 The EP does not have the
power to amend the framework.135 Because of the required unanimity, single member states have a
125 Piris, Lisbon Treaty, p. 74 f.
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considerable  array  of  power  in  negotiating  the  MFF.  Furthermore,  finding  a  lowest  common
denominator that the diverse political actors and institutions of the EU can agree on inevitably leads
to a high number of compromises that undermine decisive action where it is necessary. While the
negotiations of the current MFF (2014-2020) had already proven to be difficult, lacking common
goals and struggling to unite the member states diverging interests,136 the situation will proof to be
more difficult  for the coming MFF. Political concessions will have to be made to convince the
member states of supporting the Commissions financial goals set out in the EGD. As will be seen,
the deal itself already contains these kind of concessions towards some member states.
The  annual  budget  of  the  EU  will  be  another  “battlefield”  for  the  Commission's  objectives.
Normally during October,  A draft  of the budget is presented to the Council  and the EP by the
Commission.137 Both institutions then have to approve of the budget. If one of them rejects the
budget, the Council mainly aiming to reduce expenditure, the EP mainly amending the budget to fit
it's own political ambitions, both institutions will come together in a Conciliation Committee, for a
further  21  day  period  of  negotiations,  too  present  a  new  budget.138 The  budget  itself  is  also
determined by the MFF, in the sense that each budget is an allocation of the funds provided by the
MFF to a single year.139 It should come to no surprise that the EU budget can be used as a tool  for
the political power struggle between EU institutions. While the Council can use the argument of
national budgetary constraints to refuse funding certain projects or topple some of the Commissions
objectives altogether,140 the EP, through the negotiations, has the opportunity to not only further it's
own political  priorities  and  demand  funding  for  projects  it  feels  to  be  neglected  by the  other
institutions, but also to further it's own political prerogatives.141 Since the EGD was introduced after
the original approval of this year's budget and since many amendments to the budget had to be
made in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemia,  there yet exists  no example of how the EGD's
provisions are  translated into the EU's financial  procedures.  But  it  can already be guessed that
budgetary negotiations regarding the EDG's ambitions will  be complicated.  As the Commission
under von der Leyen has no comfortable majority but has to rely on the support of wide array of
politically conflicting parties, many concessions and appeasing decisions will have to be made to
get  the  coming  years'  budget  approved.142 While  everyone  in  theory  backs  the  EGD,  the
Commission tries to gain Poland's and Hungary's, whose economies deeply depend on the coal and
136 de Gardebosc & Mesdag, European Parliament, p. 195 f.
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fossil fuel using sectory, support by promising them financial incentives.143 Especially Poland insists
at reaching the zero-emission target depending on it's own economical capabilities, whereas Spain,
Sweden or Latvia push for an even higher reduction of emissions by 2030. 144
6. The European Green Deal
6.1 Structure of the EGD
In the following, an analysis will be given over the core idea's of the European Green Deal, which
climate related challenges it will adress, it's shortcomings and which difficulties the deal might face.
Some  parts  of  the  deal  will  be  left  out  in  this  section,  since  they  overlap  contentwise  with
programmes the Commission has further elaborated since the publication of the deal and which will
be discuseed in other chapters of this thesis. This is mainly true for some subchapters of the second
section of the EGD “Transforming the EU's economy for a sustainable future“, as it describes ideas
for  the  industrial  transformation  and  circular  economy,  sustainable  investment  and  the  Just
Transition  Mechanisms,  which  will  be  focused upon individually later  on.  The analysis  of  the
EGD's second chapter will still be the main focus of the following text, as it takes up the largest part
of  the deal.  While  the  first  section  “Introduction – Turning an urgent  Challenge into a  unique
Opportunity“ lays out the basic ideas and goals of the EGD, the third section “The EU as a Global
Leader“  outlines  the  Commission's  ambition reagarding the  international  position  of  the EU in
questions  of  environmental  protection,  whereas  the  final  section  “Time  to  act  –  Together:  A
European Climate Pact“ introduces the core concepts of the aforementioned Pact and gives some
final remarks on realising effective policies, legislation, and the diversion of funds.
Before starting the detailed investigation of the deal's content, five main ideas should already be
introduced, that have to be kept in mind while reading the deals objectives and stipulations: First,
the deal aims for the transformation of the European economy towards a sustainable economy,
while also trying to offset  the challenges presented by this transformation. Second, through the
concept of the circular economy, the Commission tries to combine sustainability with economic
growth. Third, often the measures the deal can propose are limited by the lack of competences of
the European institutions, which only can decide upon standardized production, trading and market
rules within the EU without the possiblity of member state deviation. Fourth, since in a globalized




be found through changes on a global scale. Because of this, the success of everything proposed by
the deal also depends on the EU'S success of promoting environmental protection on a globally.
And fifth, the EGD itself is only a first outline of different strategies, all of which will be presented
in more detail until the end of 2021. Anything analysed, criticised and evaluated in this paper can
therefore  be  only  seen  as  preliminary,  as  many  ideas  and  their  realization  are  still  uncertain,
especially considering the ongoing pandemia.    
6.2 Introduction to the European Green Deal
In  the  EGD's  introduction,  the  Commission  postulates  “climate  and  environmental-related
challenges [as] this generation’s defining task.”145 Listing global warming, the loss of biodiversity,
and the destruction of forrests and oceans, the Commission envisions the EGD as an opportunity to 
“transform the  EU into a  fair  and prosperous society,  with a  modern,  resource-efficient  and
competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where
economic growth is decoupled from resource use.“
Therefore,  the  EGD  is  supposed  to  maintain  the  current  economic  paradigm  of  growth.  The
undocking of economic growth from resource and material usage seems paradoxical at first, but,
from the Commission's point of view, can be realized through establishing a circular economy. The
basic concept of a CE contains reintroducing every kind of waste back into the productive process,
thus raising production efficiency and profits, while reducing waste.  Additionally,  this approach
operates under the framework outlined by the UN sustainable development goals, as will be seen
shortly.
Apart from these economical aims, the Commission, through the EGD, plans to “protect, conserve
and  enhance  the  EU's  natural  capital,  and  protect  the  health  and  well-being  of  citizens  from
environment-related risks and impacts“, meaning that efforts of natural preservation and regaining
environmental  wealth,  through  e.g.  furthering  biodiversity,  will  be  taken.  Additionally,  the
Commission stresses the idea that the transition to a more environmentally friendly economy has to
be “just and inclusive“, and should be supported by “public participation and confidence“. To this
end,  the Commission designed the Just  Transition  Mechanism, as  will  be discussed in  another
chapter. To further public participation, the EGD calls for  
“a new pact is needed to bring together citizens in all their diversity, with national, regional, local
145 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 2.
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authorities, civil society and industry working closely with the EU’s institutions and consultative
bodies“,
an idea, which is supposed to be realized through the “Climate Pact“.
The Commission further hails the, through it's “collective ability“ to be “a global leader on climate
and environmental measures, consumer protection, and workers’ rights”, capable of undertaking the
massive economical and societal transformations necessary for combatting climate change. “Public
investment and increased efforts to direct private capital towards climate and environmental action”
will  play  a  substantial  role  in  these  processes.  The  EU's  strategy  for  these  investments,  the
“Sustainable Investment Plan“, will be analysed in the chapters to come. 
Furthermore, as the EGD's environmental ambitions cannot be “achieved by Europe acting alone“,
the EU should use its “influence, expertise and financial resources to mobilise its neighbours and
partners  to  join it  on a  sustainable path“.  This  statement  is  immediately followed by a  caveat,
explaining  that  the  EU  “also  recognises  the  need  to  maintain  its  security  of  supply  and
competitiveness  even  when  others  are  unwilling  to  act”,  which  lastly  assigns  economical
endeavours and continued growth a higher priority than radical action on climate change.
Lastly,  the  introduction  proclaims,  that  every EU action  and policy should  opperate  under  the
framework laid out by the EGD, which is also part of the EU's strategy of implementing the UN's
2030 Agenda, drafted in September 2015, and its sustainable development goals.146 Among these
development  goals are striving to keep the rise  in global  temperatures  below 1.5 or 2 degrees,
transform urban environments to be less hazardous for nature, increase the spread and usage of
environmentally friendly technologies, and creating sustainable, resilent agriculture.147 With these
goals, the UN also demands  “to  decouple economic growth from environmental degradation [...]
with  developed  countries  taking  the  lead“  which  the  EGD  copies  nearly  verbatim,  as  quoted
above.148 While the UN goals also heavily focus on waste reduction, recycling, and more efficiency
in resource usage,149 they never explicitly mention plans for a CE. 
6.3 The Economical Transformation of Europe
As has been mentioned, some of the contents of the second section of the EGD strongly overlap
with contents that will be covered in other chapters. Suggestions and plans regarding the CE or
investments will be left out. 
146 European Green Deal, p. 3.
147 United Nations, Sustainable Development.
148 Ibid., cf. goal 8.4.
149 Ibid., cf. point 34, as well as goals 8.4, 11.6, 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5.
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On a  fundamental  level,  the  EU aims  to  “rethink  policies  for  clean  energy supply  across  the
economy,  industry,  production  and  consumption,  large-scale  infrastructure,  transport,  food  and
agriculture, construction, taxation and social benefits“.150 This would be achieved by “increas[ing]
the value given to protecting and restoring natural ecosystems, to the sustainable use of resources
and to improving human health“. The Commission therefore postulates that every aspect of modern
society has to be transformed to account for effective environmental protection. To this end, the
Comission  vows  to  utilize  every  tool  at  its  disposal,  naming  “regulation  and  standardisation,
investment  and  innovation,  national  reforms,  dialogue  with  social  partners  and  international
cooperation”.
6.3.1 Increasing the  European Climate Ambitions
As a centre piece of these ambitions lies the Commisions promise to achieve European climate
neutrality  by  2050.  This  goal  was  to  be  enshrined  in  a  “European  Climate  Law”,  which  was
proposed on th 4th of March 2020 and has yet to be accepted by the EP.151 As has been pointed out,
2050  is  the  year  by  which  global  emission  neutrality  has  to  be  achieved  to  prevent  global
temperatures from rising more than 1.5 to 2 degrees. In accordance with the zero emission target,
the EU also established a emission reduction target “for 2030 to at least 50% and towards 55%
compared  with  1990  levels”.  An  important  instrument  in  these  efforts  will  be  the  “Emissions
Trading System [and] Member State targets to reduce emissions in sectors outside the Emissions
Trading  System”.  While  the  establishment  of  member  state  targets  poses  a  difficult  political
problem, as will be seen in the discussion of the Just Transition Mechanism, the ETS in the past has
proved to be inefficient as being a meaningful instrument in reducing emissions.
An ETS establishes a market for GHG emissions. In the case of the EU, within this market an
absolute  limit  for  emissions  exists,  that  a  specific  group  of  emitters  may not  surpass  without
penalties.152 Companies, for example, receive a certain number of free allowances that represent the
number of GHG emissions they may emit in a certain time period.153 Further allowances can be
bought from other emitters, who do not intend to use their allowances, whereas allowances that
have not been used can also be saved for the future.154 Within this system, supply and demand of
allowances  determines  the  price  companies  have  to  pay  for  emitting  a  tonne  of  carbon.155
150 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 4.
151 European Commission, European Climate Law.





Theoretically, this system allows governments enough control over carbon emission, while at the
same time leaving room for flexibility among economic actors to comply with emission targets,
thus creating a fairly liberal market within a set of market regulations.156 The EU established its ETS
during a pilot phase between 2005 and 2007 and finalized the system during the second Kyoto
commitment  period  of  2008  to  2012.157 During  these  early  stages,  the  ETS  functioned  very
decentralised and was restricted to the power sector and energy-intensive industries, while from
2013 onwards there was a shift towards more centralization of the carbon market, as well as the
promotion  of  the carbon allowance trade.158 These changes  were  necessary since  the per  tonne
carbon  price  had  remained  below 8€ since  2012,  only starting  to  rise  again  in  2018,159 while
measures for price stabilisation have been adopted in 2015 and started operating in 2019.160 This
collapse of the EU's carbon market lead to plummeting coal prices, without any real penalities for
its usage.161 A variety of influences lead to the emission prices being neither predictably high and
nor  stable,  as  would  be  necessary  for  effectively  discouraging  high  emissions.  The  economic
downturn  after  the  financial  crash  of  2008  and  the  overabundance  of  allowances  within  the
European ETS lead to a significant drop in demand.162 Furthermore, the availability of emission
efficient technologies equally influence the prize of emission allowances, as well as “the threshold
at  which  investing  in  innovation  becomes  economically  more  feasible  than  purchasing  carbon
allowances” as Biedenkopf and Wettestad point out.163 Despite these problems, the EU plans to
further the range of its ETS, even envisioning "international carbon markets" as mentioned by the
EGD.164 Somewhat acknowledging these issues, the EGD, as well as the “Sustainable Investment
Plan”, promise to revision the ETS.165 For the Commission's plans, effectively realizing this step is
indispensable. Not only does the Commission see the ETS as a necessary tool “to ensure effective
carbon pricing throughout the economy. This will encourage changes in consumer and business
behaviour”.166 The  Commission  also  intents  to  utilize  revenues  generated  by the  ETS for  “the
financing  of  the  just  transition“.167 If  therefore  emissions  are  not  priced  sufficiently  high,  the
Commission will fall short of realizing its own ambitions.
Another problem with the ETS and generally with GHG emission reduction targets lies in the fact,
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that they can only actively be enforced within the EU. The Commission acknowledges this issue by
addressing  the  “risk  of  carbon  leakage”,  which  it  defines  as  emission  heavy production  being
transferred from the EU “to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction”, or the
import of emission heavy products which are not created within the EU.168 As a cause for this risk,
the EGD solely identifies “international partners [who] do not share the same ambition as the EU”.
To counter this, the Commission proposes “a carbon border adjustment mechanism”, which is set to
“ensure that price imports reflect more accurately their carbon content”, while at the same time
assuring that these measures would “comply with World Trade Organization rules”. Since the WTO
rules are extremly complex and cannot be discussed in full detail, it should suffice to assert that the
organization  generally  strives  for  free,  unrestricted  trade.  As  such,  European  mechanisms  to
artifically augment prices for products imported into the EU could prove problematic and might be
interpreted as protectionist measures. These, of course, would be necessary in the sense that the
Commission wants to maintain the competitiveness of European businesses.  If these businesses
were  the  only  ones  following  environmental  regulations,  they  would  face  an  economical
disadvantage on a global stage. Raising prices for foreign products might therefore not only be a
measure of environmental protection, but also a protectionist strategy, similar to the once employed
by the US or  China in  recent  years,  albeit  more subtle.  It  should be remembered as  well  that
questions of market regulation and access to the EU's common market are the only competences
where the EU institutions can take binding decisions for member states.
Apart from this, one might also argue that a lot of carbon leakage is created by European businesses
themselves, which might have their headquarters within the EU, but operate their production centres
in countries with weaker emission regulations. It would therefore seem sensible to force European
companies to adhere to European environmental protection standards outside of the EU as well and
throughout  the  whole  production  chain,  as  to  not  only prevent  the  import  of  carbon intensive
products by these companies, but also as to ensure the environmental integrity in the areas where
production is conducted. 
6.3.2 Plans for Clean energy
A further  core  concern  for  the  Commission  is  the  provision  of  “clean,  affordable  and  secure
energy”, which the EGD describes as critical to reach its climate objectives.
The production and use of energy across economic sectors account for more than 75% of the
168 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 5.
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EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. Energy efficiency must be prioritised. A power sector must be
developed that is based largely on renewable sources, complemented by the rapid phasing out of
coal and decarbonising gas. 
In response to these plans, Jäger-Waldau, Kougias, Taylor et al. conducted a study, showing thar the
most  cost-efficient  way  of  achieving  the  Commission's  energy  goals  would  be  the  intensified
construction of photovoltaics.169 Not only are they already build en masse within the EU, they also
take up less space then traditional power plants or windfarms, as they can simply be installed on
rooftops.170 According  to  the  authores'  estimates,  the  potential  use  of  rooftops  in  the  EU  for
photovoltaics could generate 680 TWh of electricity per year.171 As a side-effect, between 60.000
and  150.000  construction  jobs  would  be  created  by  2030.172 Throuhg  rooftop  constructions,
residential areas and businesses of the tertiary sector, which make up 57% of the EU's electricity
demand,  could directly satified.173 It  would  still  be necessary though to completly electrify the
transpot sector, which might proof more difficult.
Another difficulty in promoting photovoltaic and other renewable sources of energy is found in the
current market arrangements within EU member states. As the authors point out: “For PV and other
renewables, the experience of the last 15 years has been one of a policy-driven market environment
and as  such highly sensitive  to  policy changes  at  the  national  level.”174 Their  suggestion  is  to
“implement  stable  market  reform“,  such  as  “uniform  access  to  low  credit  risk  financing  for
renewable projects in all member states“ to secure necessary investments for the rising demand in
clean  energy.175 Under  the  assumption  of  energy  demand  rising  by  13% until  2030,  the  EU's
photovoltaic  market  volume would  have  to  grow by three  to  five  times,  as  well  as  providing
possibilities of storing electricity generate by windfarms and photovoltaics.176 Interestingly enough,
the  EGD  does  not  mention  photovoltaics  and  only  postulates,  that  “increasing  offshore  wind
production will  be essential“.177 An issue of course is  that decisions over the energy sector  are
competences that only lay with member states. The therefore could not e.g. propose production
quotas. Still, the EGD also fails to propose investment for furthering the construction of renewable
energy sources, which would be well in the realm of possible instruments commanded by the EU.
The EGD only calls  for “increased cross-border and regional cooperation [to] help achieve the
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benefits of the clean energy transition at affordable prices”, while at the same time highlighting that
“the rapid decrease in the cost of renewables, combined with improved design of support policies,
has already reduced the impact on households’ energy bills of renewables deployment“.178  This
statement  is  more than misleading though,  as  between 2008 and 2019 the  prices  per  kWh for
household consumers have risen by 37.5% from 0.16€ to around 0.22€, whereas prices per kWh for
non-household consumers have only increased by around 20% from 0.1€ to 0.12€.179 Given these
developments, it seem dubitable that the EU will actually address “the risk of energy poverty […]
for households that cannot afford key energy services“. While at the most direct solution for the
issue would seem to lie in subsidizing reneweable energy and kWh prices generated by these for
low-income  households,  the  EGD  envisions  “programmes,  such  as  financing  schemes  for
households to renovate their houses, [which] can reduce energy bills“. While it is of course the case
that more energy-efficient households would utilize less energy and pay therefore less in energy
bills,  this  measure  would  not  adress  low-income  households  at  risk  of  “energy  poverty“.
Benefactors of such a measure would primarily be people owning property to live in, or landlords
and property companies, who could use the subsidized renovations as a way of raising rents. 
In a further subchapter, titidled “Building and renovating in an energy and resource efficient way”,
renovations are presented as the main way of reducing energy consumption in buildings. According
to the deal, “Buildings […] account for 40% of energy consumed“ and the annual renovation rate,
which “varies from 0.4 to 1.2% in the Member States“ has to “ at least to double to reach the EU’s
energy efficiency and climate objectives”.180 To this end, the Commission demands to engage in a
“'renovation wave' of public and private buildings” which would “lowers energy bills, […] reduce
energy poverty [and]  also boost the construction sector”. Furthermore, “the Commission will also
launch  work  on  the  possibility  of  including  emissions  from  buildings  in  European  emissions
trading”,  while  the  renovations  will  “  at  all  stages  [be]  in  line  with  the  needs  of  the  circular
economy”.181 While the general assumption of renovations bringing lowering energy consumption
and  supporting  the  construction  sector  cannot  be  denied,  the  question  still  remains,  if  these
measures will actually be advantageous for households suffering “energy poverty” for the reasons
listed above. Measures are needed to ensure that renovations increasing energy efficiency will not
result in an elevated pressure on tenants via rents. It is further interesting, that the EGD fails to
mention investments into renewable energies, but is ready to proposing porgrammes for housing
renovations.
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Another issue is disregarded by this subsection. Based on numbers provided by the Commission
itself,  the  EU's  level  of  urbanization  is  expected  to  reach 83.7% by 2050.182 While  half  of  all
European cities will lose population by 2050, the average increase of people living in urban areas
still lies at 4%. While the loss of population in some urban areas and the growth of population in
others this can be explained by inter-urban migration and general demographic trends, the average
increase of urban population still  hints  at  the necessity of constructing more buildings in cities
affected  by  growth.  While  the  EGD  acknowgledes  the  problem  of  the  energy-intensity  of
construction  projects,183 it  does  not  address  the  probable  rise  in  demand  for  new  living  and
commercial space. This issue cannot be solved by renovation and might make renovation superflous
in some regions of Europe alltogether, since inhabited areas in the countryside will be abandoned
more and more. It also poses an issue for the goal of aligning the construction sector with the
circular  economy plan.  Of  course  building  materials,  such  as  concrete  can  be  reused,  but  the
practicability and energy-efficiency of demolishing a building and then transporting the material left
behind to another city, remains questionable. A different strategy might be creating incentives for
people to move to and stay in the countryside. But as the whole phenomenon of urbanization is
incredibly complex and movement of people largely depends on economic possibility, which within
tertiary economies is mainly found within cities, this solution is easier proposed than achieved. 
As a whole though, there is no reason to doubt that the EU, continously strives to augment the
contribution of renewable power sources to energy consumption, even though this progress is only
achieved very slowly. As of 2018, the EU was well on track of reaching the targeted 20% share of
renewable energy in energy consumption, having experienced an increase from 9.6% in 2004 to
18.9% in 2018 and aiming to reach 32% by 2030.  These numbers  and objectives  are  too  low
considering the goals for 2050, and it is telling that the EGD does not propose any measure of how
to increase the share of renewables in energy consumption, nor does it propose new targets for
reaching  certain  shares  by  a  certain  date,  instead  delegating  the  task  to  the  member  states
demanding that they “present their revised energy and climate plans by the end of 2019, [which]
should set  out ambitious  national contributions to  EU-wide targets.”184 While  of course the EU
institutions  cannot  interfere  in  member  states  decisions  regarding  the  energy sector,  at  least  a
proposal for desired results could have been made to give the European public an overview of the
necessities for a transformation towards a environmentally friendly society. But it cannot be denied
that a transformation is, indeed, taking place.185 The reason for these ambitions might not be caused
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by considerations about the environment though.
The question of clean,  renewable energy is  not  only of  environmental,  but  also of geopolitical
importance. As for now, European energy supply mainly depends on fossil fuels.186 90% of oil and
60% of gas used within the EU have to be imported.187 Achieving emission neutrality would nullify
these imports and carry far-reaching implications for energy geopolitics.  As an economical war
surrounding oil prices is again and again being fought between the US and the oil monarchies,
Russia's economy continues to depend on oil and gas exports to the EU and therefore has an interest
in hindering the EU's transition to renewable energies.188 To be independent of these conflicts and of
energy provided by countries acting contrary to European values and necessities of environmental
protection, it is indispensable to achieve the transformation envisioned by the EGD. Reducing these
dependencies is also one of the main objectives of the European Energy Union. It therefore seems
plausible that these concerns might be a main motivator for the Commission to at least publicy
proclaim to strive for climate neutrality and the achievement of the targets set out in Paris. While
the Commission does not publish any direct statements regarding these geopolitical concerns, it
states that one aim of the energy sector's transformation is to achieve “reduced dependency on fossil
fuel markets (in particular, oil and gas)”,189 resources which are mainly imported from Russia.190 A
similar intent might be found in the EGD's following passage:
In parallel,  the decarbonisation of the gas sector  will  be facilitated,  including via  enhancing
support  for  the  development  of  decarbonised  gases,  via  a  forward-looking  design  for  a
competitive decarbonised gas market.191
Currently, this objective is jeopardized by Germany's and Russia's Nord Stream 2 enterprise, which
will not only increase at least German dependeny on Russian gas, but also lead to increased gas
prices for consumers, as the project is more expansive than profitable.192
6.3.3 Sustainable Mobility
As the EGD acknowledges, transforming the way transport is conducted within the EU is one major
necessity for achieving climate neutrality.
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“Transport accounts for a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions [...]. To achieve climate
neutrality, a 90% reduction in transport emissions is needed by 2050.[...] Achieving sustainable
transport means putting users first and providing them with more affordable, accessible, healthier
and cleaner alternatives to their current mobility habits.”193
As key strategies for achieving these goals,  the Commission on the one hand explains “that   a
substantial part of the 75% of inland freight carried today by road should shift onto rail and inland
waterways,” which “will require measures to manage better, and to increase the capacity of railways
and inland waterways”. Additionally, the Commission plans to end “fossil-fuel subsidies […], [and]
will closely look at current tax exemptions“. To accomodate the energy needs of the “13 million
zero- and low-emission vehicles expected on European roads” expected by 2025, the Commission
calculates with a need of  “1 million public recharging and refuelling stations”, a gap whose closure
the Commission wants to support, “complement[ing] the measures taken at national level”.194 It is
indeed important that tax advantages are to be ended and the necessary infrastructure is to be build.
Still, the proposed measures appear to be a rather symptomatic approach by the Commission. While
in 2016 water navigation was responsible for 13.6% GHG emissions in transport, civil aviation for
13.4%,  railway transport  for  0.5% and other  methods  of  transport  for  another  0.5  %,  72% of
transport emission stemed from road transportation. To these emissions, heavy and light duty trucks
contributed 28.1%, whereas cars and motorcycles contributed 61.9%.195 Therefore, while directing
tranpsortation of goods away from roads and towards railway and maritime transport (which would
have  to  be  supported  by  alternative,  sustainable  fuels)  would  contribute  significantly  to  the
reduction of the EU's transportation emission, the EGD lacks in presenting a larger strategy of how
to significantly reduce emissions produced through the usage of private vehicles. Neither does it
propose measures for introducing a certain number of cars powered by electricity to the European
market, nor does it discuss incentives for industries to produce and for consumers to acquire such
vehicles. Furthermore, electric vehicles might also be used for freight transportation, thus reducing
the need for train and waterway capacities. 
It is of course difficult to introduce such technologies and change consumer behaviour over night,
as it is equally necessary to create a framework wherein these technologies can be used fruitfully.
Nevertheless, a starting point into such a direction needs to be made. In a study by Tsakalidis, van
Balen, Gkoumas and Pekar about transport innovation in regards to the EGD,  the authors call for a
“Strategic Transport Research and Innovation Agenda“, which could serve as a guideline for the EU
193 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 10.
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to transform the transport  sector.196 Among others,  a supportive framework should be given for
innovation regarding transport electrification, especially for “multi-sectorial […] activities on new
materials  [and]  advanced  propulsion”,  experimenting  with  vehicle  design  and  manufacturing,
supporting the development of “low-emission Alternative Energy for Transport“,  the support of
emerging  technologies,  and  the  development  of  transport  infrastructure,  research,  and  testing
methodologies.197 Despite implementing such strategies, it would still remain difficult to bring about
a “transport innovation revolution“ as the authors acknowledge, since the transport system and its
technological  basis  are  highly  complex  and  interconnected  with  various  other  sectors,  while
consumers at the same time are often reluctant to adopt new technologies.198 But failling to establish
a framework that at  least  intents to offset  these problems by facilitating a cooperation between
business, governments and academia would lead to the deterioration of the situation in the long
run.199 As the authors further point out, there is a lack of pressure on the automotive industry to
transform and refocus their production, as this sector often carries special economical importance to
certain EU member states.200 Accordingly, just “closely looking at current tax exemptions“ will not
be sufficient to combat climate change.
In  a  similar  vain,  the  EGD  fails  to  present  a  way  of  changing  behaviours  regarding  urban
transportation. To reduce transport pollution within cities, the EGD suggests “more stringent air
pollutant  emissions  standards,  […]  to  revise  by  June  2021  the  legislation  on  CO2  emission
performance standards for cars and vans, [and to] consider applying European emissions trading to
road  transport”.201 While  it  mentions  the  need  for  “improved  public  transport“202,  there  is  no
mention of  how this  improvement  is  going to  take place.  Generally,  for  the question  of  urban
transport  the  deal  fails  to  consider  the  encouragment  of  reduced  car  usage  within  cities,  the
extension of public transport, and the promotion of biking and biking lanes. While it mostly likely
would not be possible to remove cars completly from within cities, changing transport behaviour
would in the longterm be equally important as simply promising to review emissions standards,
especially considering the difficulty of widely establishing new technologies within the automotive
industry. Yet again, these decisions are not part of the EU's competences and have to made on a
local level. But to further goals as the one's outlined above, the Commission could have called for a
joint-strategy development between European decisions to make suggestions, self-commitments and
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funding for reducing car usage within cities. As has been mentioned though, suggesting a reduction
of the economically important automotive sector would lead to the opposition of influential EU
member states.
Apart from these concerns, the question of fuel usage has to be addressed. While trains and cars can
be powered by electricity, the Commission stresses the importance of “ramp[ing]-up the production
and deployment of sustainable alternative transport fuels” for maritime transport and aviation, while
it will also “consider legislative options to boost the production and uptake” of these fuels.203 An
important alternative to electricity and fossil fuel are biofuels. Biofuels are obtained from resources
“such as woody biomass, hydrogenated fats and oils, recycled waste or other renewable sources”.204
Under some models, 
“emissions from biofuel combustion are [...] considered as being zero, given that the fuels are
produced from biomass. These are referred to as ‘biogenic emissions’, and they are assumed to
be zero on the basis that the growth of the biomass absorbs the same amount of CO2 released
during combustion.”205
Specifically in the sector of aviation, these biofuels could be a bridging solution, until technologies,
that  are  unquestionably  free  from any kind  of  emission,  “such  as  electric-powered  aircraft  or
cryogenic  hydrogen  fuel”,  become  viable  for  comercial  air  transport  by  around  2030,  as  the
European Union Aviation Safety Agency suggests.206 Currently though, the EU only disposes of “ a
maximum potential output of approximately 2.3 million tonnes per year  […]  which potentially
corresponds to about 4% of the total EU conventional fossil aviation fuel demand.”207 Thus, this
sector is still in massive need of subventions and promotions by eitehr the EU or the member states
to  cover  fuel  demand  by  aviation  alone,  not  to  mention  maritime  or  potentially  automotive
transport. 
A further proposal by the Commission references the restart of the “Single European Sky [...] as this
will  help  achieve  significant  reductions  in  aviation  emissions.“208 The  Single  European  Sky
initiative, started in 1999 and set to complete at around 2030 to 2035, aims at integrating European
airspace  in  a  way that  improves  air  traffic  management  and air  navigation,  which  would raise
airspace capacity and potentially reduce the environmental impact of aviation by 10%.209 While this
would also mean a considerable contribution to the EGD goal's of climate neutrality, the year of
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2035 and a reduction of only 10% of environmental impacts achieves too little in a timeframe that
would ultimately leave only fifteen years for the EU to reach climate neutrality. The success of this
initiative in regards to environmental protection would therefore heavily hinge on the success on the
aforementioned alternative fuels. It is further telling,  that the Commission does not in any way
consider the reduction of air traffic altogether or even the ban of domestic flights while at the same
time encouraging the expansion of inter-european, comercial railway networks. Finally, the question
remains of how flights entering the EU would be counted under the assumption of a zero emission
goal.
6.3.4 The Farm to Fork Initiative
As the world population grows and with it the demand for food, so will GHG emissions through the
agricultural sector increase. Animal husbandry alone is estimated to contribute between 15 and 20%
to global emissions by 2030.210 This problem is highlighted by the EGD in the subchapter  “From
‘Farm to Fork’: designing a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system”, stressing that
in the context of a growing world population 
“food  production  still  results  in  air,  water  and  soil  pollution,  contributes  to  the  loss  of
biodiversity and climate change, and consumes excessive amounts of natural resources, while an
important part of food is wasted. At the same time, low quality diets contribute to obesity and
diseases such as cancer.“211
This not only acknowgledes the environmental impact of agriculture, but also the dietary impact on
human health. To solve this problem, the Commission proposes a “Farm to Fork” strategy, to adress
any environmental issue that arises from food production to food consumption. At the heart of this
strategy, the EGD sees food producers themselves.  “European farmers and fishermen are key to
managing the transition. The Farm to Fork Strategy will strengthen their efforts to tackle climate
change,  protect  the  environment  and  preserve  biodiversity.”212 To  realize  this  ambition,  the
Commission proposes, “that at least 40% of the common agricultural policy’s overall budget […]
would contribute to climate action.“ The EGD incidates, that these funds could be used for plans to
“reduce significantly the use and risk of chemical pesticides, as well as the use of fertilisers and
antibiotics”,  which  would  be  encouraged  through  legislative  measures,  or  for  the  funding  of
reducing “the environmental impact of the food processing and retail sectors by taking action on
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transport, storage, packaging and food waste” and thus integrating the agricultural sector into the
CE. As the idea behing the concept of the CE is to raise the efficiency of resource usage, it can be
supposed that the loss of agricultural production through the abstention from fertilizers, pesticides
etc.  would  be  off-set  by  increasing  the  efficiency  of  e.g.  soil-usage.  As  studies  have  shown,
addressing resource efficiency in food producing industries is key in solving the problem of feeding
more people, while protecting the environment.213 Furthermore, many of the emissions produced by
the agricultural sector, result from transport and logistic processes in within the globalized food
industry.214 It would also seems plausible to delegate responsibility for the protection of biodiversity
to farmers, as they would potentially be the ones knowing the local flora and fauna best. 
One problem though is, that the EGD evokes the image of farmers contributing to food production
as individuals, who would receive the promised aid for the necessary transition. This conceals the
fact, that as of 2013, of the 4.4 million farms in the EU, 69.1% might have been small farms and
subsitence housholds, but these only contributed 5% to the EU's food output.215 Very large farms,
meaning farms of a standard output of at least 100000 Euro, only made up 6.3% of total farms in
the EU, but produced 71.4% of agricultural output in 2013.216 Accordingly, these farms are the one's
mainly  responsible  for  climate  emissions  and  would  be  the  chief  benefactors  of  the  subsidies
promised by the EGD. This,  and probably the fact  that  the EGD at  not  points  talks  about  the
necessity  of  reducing  animal  husbandry  as  a  means  to  combat  climate  change,  might  have
contributed to the enthusiastic support of the EGD published by the European Diary Association.217
Furthermore,  the  EGD fails  to  adress  droughts  and heat  periods.  As  by 2050,  precipitation  in
Central Europe and the Mediterranean will reduce by 15% and mean ambient temperatures will rise
by 2 degrees,  crop yield and fertile soil  will  decrease.218 Animals will  suffer heat stress,  which
negatively affects  their  capacity of producing milk.219 Accordingly,  a strategy of preventitive or
alleviation is necessary to help farmers become more resilent towards these specific environmental
stressors.
Another  problematic  aspect  of  the “Farm to Fork strategy” only becomes evident  after  careful
consideration. As the EGD proclaims “European food is famous for being safe, nutritious and of
high quality. It should now also become the global standard for sustainability.”220 And further:
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“the Farm to Fork Strategy will strive to stimulate sustainable food consumption and promote
affordable  healthy  food  for  all.  Imported  food  that  does  not  comply  with  relevant  EU
environmental standards is not allowed on EU markets.“221
For European consumers, this stipulation is indeed a desirable objective. In part, it might also be a
polemic that was inspired by fierce public outcries over food regulation debates in the context of the
TTIP.222 But higher standards in food regulations inevitably lead to international market inequalities,
favouring  agricultural  businesses,  who command  the  capacity  and  technology to  produce  food
complying with these standards. While this might not be problematic for farmers in e.g. the United
States, African economies would have to make costly investments to be able to participate in the
European Market.  223 Of course the reduction of regulations cannot be a solution to this problem.
But if  the Commission has an interest  in making these countries more resilent towards climate
change,  as it  claims in  the EGD's third section,  it  should,  through investments or development
funds,  help  these  countries  in  establishing  a  sustainable  agricultural  sector,  that  is  capable  of
competing in international markets. 
Lastly, the subchapter mentions the issue of “healthy and sustainable diets”.224 To direct consumers
towards desirable dietary behaviour, 
“the Commission will  explore new ways to give consumers better  information,  including by
digital  means,  on  details  such  as  where  the  food  comes  from,  its  nutritional  value,  and  its
environmental footprint."
A shift in dietary habits would not only help reduce obesity rates and the likelihood of suffering
strokes  or  diseases  such  as  diabetes,  but  also  might  facilitate  keeping  the  food  system within
planetary boundaries.225 It  is  questionable  though,  that  simply giving  more  information  will  be
sufficient to steer consumer behaviour. The source of this idea might be the assumption that people
are rational consumers, whose economic decision making is based on critically evaluating product
information. Thus, the only regulations necessary would be forcing industries to display nutritional
values, a products origin etc. But these information only help consumers, who are already interested
in consuming healthily and sustainably, and who know how to interpret the given information. The
rest might simply choose to disregard it. Therefore, keeping with the aformentioned conception of
consumers,  it  would furthermore be necessary to  educate  the public  on this  very issue,  e.g.  in
221 Ibid., p. 12.
222 cf. Inman, P., Prospect Of TTIP Already Undermining EU Food Standards, Say Campaigners.
223 Anderson, Morton & Toulmin, Agrarian Societies, p, 209.
224 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 12.
225 Haines & Scheelbeck, European Green Deal, p. 1328; Vanham & Leip, p. 3.
36
schools. This, of course, would face the problem that education is a matter of the member states and
cannot be decided upon by the EU. Nevertheless, the EU might have the capacity of supporting
programmes dedicated to dietary education.
6.3.5 Protecting Biodiversity
In  the  subchapter  “Preserving  and  restoring  ecosystems  and  biodiversity“,  the  EGD  mainly
discusses how biodiversity and natural  habitats  can be restored.  As details  for this  strategy are
seperatly laid out int the EU's “Biodiversity Strategy“ which has been published in March 2020 and
also depend on the upcomming Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
in Kunming, China, in October 2020, this chapter does not present too many details regarding how
the EU plans on reaching these goals. It  does highlight the importance of reforestation and the
success of the “Farm to Fork Strategy“ though.
As  “Ecosystems provide essential services such as food, fresh water and clean air, and shelter[,]
they mitigate natural disasters, pests and diseases and help regulate the climate”,  the Commission
sees their preservation as necessary, especially given that the “EU is not meeting some of its most
important environmental objectives for 2020”  in this regard.226 As biodiversity-loss is a result of
complex mixture between climate change, resource exploitation, monocultures and environmental
destruction in general, the measures of EGD should in one way or another all contribute to ending
further  degradation  of  biodiversity.227 Next  to  the  “Farm to  Fork  Strategy”  and  the  Kunming
Convention, 
“the Commission will identify which measures, including legislation, would help Member States
improve  and  restore  damaged  ecosystems  to  good  ecological  status,  including  carbon-rich
ecosystems.“
The success of all these measures, of course, depends on how exactly these different strategies will
look like, and if the Commission will be able to convince member states of complying with the
proposed measures. Once again, the EGD's objectives can only be reached if the member states are
willing  to  cooperate,  as  compentencies  such as  agriculture  and the  environment  in  general  are
shared between the EU and the member states. Accordingly, the only instrument the Commission
can  promise,  without  running  the  risk  of  crossing  any  institutional  boundaries,  is  funding.
Therefore,  in  line  with  these  restrictions,  “the  Commission  will  consider  drafting  a  nature
226 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 13.
227 Lawson, & Late, A Simple Ricardo-Malthusian Model, p. 1ff.
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restoration plan and will look at how provide funding to help Member States to reach this aim [of
realizing the EU's biodiversity strategy].” 
In the context of biodiversity, its preservation is not the only concern. The issue proves even more
complex when trying to restore biodiversity. In this regard, the EGD only focuses on reforestation,
as “sustainable re- and afforestation and the restoration of degraded forests can increase absorption
of CO2 while improving the resilience of forests and promoting the circular bio-economy.” This
way, the Commission hopes to reduce the occurence and extent of forest fires, and promote the bio-
economy, in full respect for ecological principles favourable to biodiversity.”228 Laying out how the
EU will actively support these measures, the Commission again highlights the competences where it
can act regardless of member state policy: “the Commission will take measures, both regulatory and
otherwise, to promote imported products and value chains that do not involve deforestation and
forest  degradation.”229 While  forests  play  an  important  part  in  local  and  global  environmental
systems, as well as influence climate and weather patterns, reforestation efforts have to be fine
tuned to the areas where they take place, since depending on geography and type of tree, effects can
vary vastly230, and might in the best case have unknown effects on climate and in the worst case
even carry with them adverse heating effects on a global scale as Popkin points out.231
Lastly, the EGD fails to adress the necessity of ending monocultural farming and forestry, as these
are also a main factor in the destruction of biodiversity.232 It is not only sufficient to reduce the
utilization of chemicals in farming, or increase the resilence of forests, but also to diversify crop and
sapling usage. It can only be hoped that this oversight is corrected in the respective EU strategies
for farming and biodiversity.
6.3.6 Creating a Toxic-Free Environment
Similarly to the biodiversity ambitions, the EGD's aim for a toxic-free environment, explained in
the subchapter  “A zero pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment”, will be influenced by the
success of the other objectives proposed by the Commission. As the EU aims to “better monitor,
report, prevent and remedy pollution from air, water, soil, and consumer products”,233 the success of
the  push  for  clean  energy,  sustainable  mobility,  the  CE,  or  the  “Farm to  Fork  Strategy”  will
228 European Green Deal, p. 13f.
229 Ibid., p. 14.
230 Cf. Sanderson, Pope, Santini, Mercogliano, Montesarchio, Influences Of EU Forests On Weather Patterns, p. 5-7 
and 19-22.
231 Popkin, Wälder, p. 56-60.
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indispensable for completely eradicating pollution. Yet again, the issue of the member states arises.
As the EU lacks the competence to decide on such matters by itself, the EGD calls for “the EU and
Member States will need to look more systematically at all policies and regulations”.
Interestingly enough, the EGD in this subchapter mentions the importance of the restoration of  “the
natural functions of ground and surface water [to] preserve and restore biodiversity in lakes, rivers,
wetlands and estuaries, and to prevent and limit damage from floods ”. Not only would one rather
expect this section as part of the chapter dealing with biodiversity specifically, where water is only
mentioned as a natural habitat and in regards to fishing, but not in the context of restoration. It is
additionally the only section in the EGD which mentions resilence towards flooding, which, as was
shown in earlier chapters, will be one of the key challenges produced by climate change.
The final paragraph of this subchapter also contains interesting information. As part of a “chemicals
strategy for sustainability, the Commission plans  “to protect citizens and the environment better
against hazardous chemicals and encourage innovation for the development of safe and sustainable
alternatives”.234 Part of these plans is “to combine better health and environmental protection and
increased global competitiveness”. This is in itself noteworthy as the reconciliation of economic
growth with sustainability is a core aspect of the EGD, as will be seen even more clearly when
analysing the CE. To reach this goal though, the Commission not only wants to “simplify[] and
strengthen[]  the  legal  framework”,  but  also  “review how to  use  better  the  EU’s  agencies  and
scientific bodies to move towards a process of ‘one substance – one assessment’”. At the moment,
risk assessment of chemicals in economic usage is realized by mutliple agencies, assessing the same
chemicals  from  different  legislative  frameworks.235 The  goal  of  the  “one  substance  –  one
assessment” objective is to eliminate superflous assessments and harmonise the process within the
EU.236 While standardising risk-assessments and making them uniform within the EU would indeed
simplify the process of introducing new chemicals to the market, but also run the risk of exchanging
more  thourough  assessment  for  the  sake  of  speed  and  purely  economical  interests,  and  might
therefore run contrary to the goals laid out by the EGD.
6.4 Mainstreaming sustainability in all EU policies 
Next  to  considerations  of  transforming  major  parts  the  European  economy  towards  a  more
sustainable model, the second section of the EGD includes proposals to mainstream sustainability in
all EU policies. The largest subchapter pertaining to this part of the EGD is devoted to the question
234 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 15.
235 Chemicalwatch, 2020. Hansen Outlines EU Cross-Agency 'One Substance – One Assessment' Plan.
236 Ibid.
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of sustainable investment and the design of a “just transition”, which will be analysed in a separate
chapter, dealing with the Commission's “Sustainable Invetsment Plan”. In the following, a look will
be taken at the last four subchapters of the EGD's second sections. Three of these will be examined
mostly in conjuction, as they mainly contain declarations of intent, calling for more investment into
research and education, as well as devoting legislation to environmental protection. The subchapter
dedicated  to  “Greening national  budgets”  will  be  singled  out,  as  the  points  it  contains  can  be
situated in a discussion of the power balance between nation states and EU institutions.
6.4.1 Greening national budgets and sending the right price signals 
Many incentives and investments for promoting a shift towards a sustainable economic and political
system can only be established by or in cooperation with the member states, as the EU institutions
autonomous  power  is  mainly  restricted  to  questions  of  trade,  commerce  and  production
frameworks. Within the EGD the Commission therefore acknowledges, that “national budgets play
a key role in the transition”.237 The Commission further explains 
“A greater use of green budgeting tools will help to redirect public investment, consumption and
taxation to green priorities and away from harmful subsidies. The Commission will work with
the Member States to screen and benchmark green budgeting practices. This will make it easier
to  assess  to  what  extent  annual  budgets  and  medium-term  fiscal  plans  take  environmental
considerations and risks into account, and learn from best practices.”
What is not mentioned though, is that for these processes to work as intended, the member states
would have to cooperate and willingly present their national budgets to the Commission to conduct
such a benchmark check, as there is no legal basis for EU institutions intervening in national budget
decisions. An exception would be the case of the Eurozone, but the incisions in national budget
autonomy were only possible in the context of the 2008 financial crash and resulting debt crises in
southern Europe. While it is true, that “tax reforms can boost economic growth and resilience to
climate shocks and help contribute to a fairer society and to a just transition”, it remains for the
member states to either realize reforms or not. The Commission might claim that “the European
Green Deal will create the context for broad-based tax reforms, removing subsidies for fossil fuels,
shifting the tax burden from labour to pollution, and taking into account social considerations”, but
this is merely an appeal and highly depends on further political maneuvering, negotiations, and
activism between EU members, as well as the civil society within the member states. While the
237 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 17.
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Commission can influence developments through modifying the allocation of EU funds, or by e.g.
altering inner European trade and production regulations, as it promises to do by revising State aid
guidelines in 2021,238 these measure represent only a fraction of the steering mechanisms which are
available to the member states and which have to be utilized by them to achieve the ambitions set
out by the EGD.
6.4.2 Funding Research and Education, and Promoting a Green Oath
As “new technologies, sustainable solutions and disruptive innovation are critical to achieve the
objectives  of  the  European Green Deal”239,  the Commission plans  on “mobilising  research  and
fostering innovation”. This is also motivated by the goal to maint Europes “competitive advantage
in clean technologies”. To this end, the Horizon Europe programme, a research fund of 100 billion
Euro that is to be launched in 2021, will dedicate “at least 35% of [its] budget” to technologies
related  to  environmental  protection.240 Funding  and  political  action  will  be  used  to  encourage
“research  and  innovation  on  transport,  including  batteries,  clean  hydrogen,  low-carbon  steel
making, circular bio-based sectors”, whilst also “emphasising experimentation, and working across
sectors and disciplines”. Additionally “digital infrastructure (e.g. supercomputers, cloud, ultra-fast
networks) and artificial intelligence solutions, [will] facilitate evidence-based decisions and expand
the capacity to understand and tackle environmental challenges”. While it is undeniably important
to uphold funding for climate related research of all kinds, it would be reckless to completely rely
on the advent of purely technical solutions to the climate crisis, as technological progress is difficult
to  determine  and  extremely  complex  in  its  structure,  which  might  be  why  the  Commission
dedicated only a shorter subchapter, filled with general statements and technological buzzwords, to
this topic.
Similarly  general  statements  are  made  about  education.  As  the  EGD states,  “Schools,  training
institutions  and  universities  are  well  placed  to  engage  with  pupils,  parents,  and  the  wider
community on the changes needed for a successful transition”.241 Without mentioning any specifics,
the Commission broadly promises to 
“prepare a European competence framework to help develop and assess knowledge, skills and
238 European Green Deal, p. 18. The Commission understands “State aid” as the following: “State aid is defined as an 
advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities.”, cf. 
European Commission, What Is State Aid?.
239 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 18.
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attitudes on climate change and sustainable development. It will also provide support materials
and facilitate the exchange of good practices in EU networks of teacher-training programmes”
It  is  of course important to promote climate education.  But the fact,  that the Commission only
mentions this area shortly and without naming any concrete measures allows conclusions about the
low importance of education on the Commissions agenda. Though a reason for this surely lies in the
fact  that  moreso  than  financial  and economical  questions,  education  remains  a  primacy of  the
member states. Once again, the Commissions main tools can be found in the attribution of funds.
This, the Commission promises to realize, by aiming to “leverag[e] €3 billion in investment in
school infrastructure in 2020” in collaboration with the European Investment Bank, and supporting
programmes  for  “pro-active  re-skilling  and  upskilling”  of  workers  to  help  them  adapt  to  a
workplace in a economy more directed towards sustainability. Here as well, no specific measures
are mentioned. Furthermore, the question arises, why the EU would not directly channel public
funds towards school's infrastructure, but would rather try to achieve this goal by raising seemingly
private investments.
Lastly, under the headline of “A green oath: ‘do no harm’“ the Commission demands that “all EU
actions and policies should pull together to help the EU achieve a successful and just transition
towards  a  sustainable  future”.  Further  general  promises  by  the  Commission  include  the
improvement of how 
“regulation guidelines and supporting tools  address sustainability and innovation issues.  The
objective is to ensure that all Green Deal initiatives achieve their objectives in the most effective
and least burdensome way and all other EU initiatives live up to a green oath to ‘do no harm’. To
this end, the explanatory memorandum accompanying all  legislative proposals and delegated
acts will include a specific section explaining how each initiative upholds this principle.”
While the declaration of following a green oath seems more like a publicity stunt that might be
employed  to  shroud  future  legislation  from  criticism  directed  at  the  lack  of  environmental
considerations,  adding  an  “explanatory  memorandum”  to  proposed  laws  would  deliver  some
transparency in  highlighting certain laws objectives,  as  well  as work as a  declaration of  intent
against which the actual law could be held against, should it fail to accomplish the objectives it
originally set out. As legislative texts are complex in their interpretation and as these memorandums
could also be formulated overly vaguely, the effects of this change might end up very minor though.
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6.5. The EU as a Global Leader
In  the  third  section  of  the  EGD  the  Commission  commits  to  a  continued  promotion  of
environmental protection in the various international constellations the EU participates in. As many
of these pledges are connected to summits, conferences, and generally diplomatic events that still
need to take place, and do by themselves not contain any detailled strategies and objectives for
these  activities,  a  summary for  most  of  them will  suffice.  A closer  look  will  be  taken  at  the
paragraphes  describing  ambitions  regarding  China,  Africa,  as  well  as  the  prevention  of
destabilization of regions vulnerable to climate change. 
In line with the self-proclaimed role as “Global Leader” in questions of environmental protection, 
“The EU will continue to promote and implement ambitious environment, climate and energy
policies across the world. [...] The Commission [...] will work closely with Member States to
mobilise all diplomatic channels both bilateral and multilateral – including the United Nations,
the G7, G20, the World Trade Organization and other relevant international fora.”242
Furthermore, in the context of the Paris Agreement and the regular stocktaking summits, “The EU
will engage more intensely with all partners to increase the collective effort.“ A “green agenda for
the Western Balkans“ will be proposed to incentivise an ecological transition in the region. Other
“green alliances” will, through “diplomatic and financial tools”, be established with countries in
Africa,  South  America,  and Asia.243 Lastly,  next  to  providing  public  development  aid,  “private
finance” will be mobilised, for which the Commission wants  to  “improve the investment climate
and [...] accompanied by opportunities to de-risk investments in sustainable development through
tools  such  as  funding  guarantees.“244 As  will  be  argued  in  the  chapter  about  the  “Sustainable
Investment Plan“, private investments might be able reduce gaps in funding, but,  if unchecked,
carry bring with them the risk of intransparency and lack of democratic legitimisation for fund
allocation. 
The thought at the core of these efforts is, that climate change can only be stopped through efforts
by the global community. Even if Europe will arrive at zero emissions by 2050, the planet will heat
up nevertheless, if the rest of the world does not comply with the Paris Agreement's comittments.
Only four EU member states were, in 2017, among the 20 most carbon emitting countries, counting
total emission, as well as emission per capita. Whereas by total emission China (9.3 GT), the USA
(4.8 GT), India (2.2 GT), Russia (1.5 GT), and Japan (1.1 GT) were among the five worst polluters,
242 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 20.
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the top five nations by emission per capita were Saudi Arabia (16.1 T), Australia (15.6 T), Canada
(14.9 T), the USA (14.6 T), and South Korea (11.7 T), with Russia (10.6 T) and Japan (8.9 T)
following on place six and seven respectively, China (6.5 T) on number 12 and India (1.6 T) on
number 20. Without getting the support of these nations for a green transformation as well, the EGD
will not achieve much on a global scale. This alone makes it imperative for the EU to act united and
coherently on the international stage as to bring enough diplomatic weight into negotiations about
actions on climate change.245 Dealing with a USA having abandoned the Paris Agreement might be
the largest challenge.
On the issue of China, the EGD only states that:  “The 2020 EU-China summits in Beijing and
Leipzig will be an opportunity to reinforce the partnership between the EU and China on climate
and environmental issues.”246 This summit will take place in September 2020 and can at the time of
writing not be commented on. As Paul Bledsoe, former climate adviser of Bill Clinton, argues: “'EU
climate leadership [in the form of] the green deal is crucial to putting pressure on China and other
major emitters to make more ambitious climate commitments.'”247 At the same time, the EU might
face further surges in populist movements, as people will see their lifestyles more and more affected
and their economies becoming less competitive, while China's economic power continues to grow
due to the countries disregard for environmental questions.248
Whereas for geostrategically powerful states EU-negotiators would have to overcome resistance
towards measures of environmental protection,  the situation is  different for countries,  who find
themselves in economically difficult positions and who would possibly depend on the support of
richer countries, to establish a sustainable economy, that simultaneously gurantees their population
a certain standard of living. As countires with lower GPD are not the main emitters of GHGs, 249 the
EU would have to follow a policy not necessarily directed towards economic transfomration, but
rather helping these countries to preserve their environment and to establish a green economy. A
strategy like this is proposed by the EGD for the EU's future relations with the African Union.  
“In particular, the Africa-Europe Alliance for sustainable investment and jobs will seek to unlock
Africa's  potential  to  make  rapid  progress  towards  a  green  and  circular  economy  including
sustainable energy and food systems and smart cities. […] The EU will launch a “NaturAfrica”
initiative to tackle biodiversity loss by creating a network of protected areas to protect wildlife
and offer opportunities in green sectors for local populations.”250
245 Union of Concerned Scientists, Each Country's Share Of CO2 Emissions.
246 European Green Deal, p. 20.
247 Harvey & Rankin, What is the European Green Deal
248 Ibid.
249 Humphreys, Introduction, p. 5.
250 European Green Deal, p. 21.
44
An example  for  a  inititive  of  this  kind  could  be  the  recent  agreement  between  Germany and
Morocco, according to which hydrogen will be produced in Morocco through renewable,  green
energies, which will then be exported to Germany to potentially serve as fuel for cars or planes.251
The success  of  deals  like  these,  of  course,  depends  on  how well  control-mechanisms  work in
assuring the ressources are actually produced in a sustainable way. Furthermore, the question exists
if  money paid during these exchanges  will  actually reach workers  in  e.g.  Morocco and would
potentially  be  reinvested  to  create  more  jobs,  social  welfare  programmes,  or  environmental
protection. As poor people in poor nations suffer disproportionately from climate crises, questions
of social justice are also interconnected with questions of environmental protection.252 And another
concern connected to these considerations arises looking at the EGD. The Commission sees trade as
an important tool in achieving progress in environmental questions.
“Commitments to sustainability have been continuously strengthened in EU trade agreements
[...]  The EU’s  trade  policy facilitates  trade  and investment  in  green goods and services  and
promotes climate-friendly public procurement. Trade policy also needs to ensure undistorted, fair
trade and investment in raw materials that the EU economy needs for the green transition. It can
help  [...]  enhance  regulatory  cooperation  promote  EU  standards  and  remove  non-tariff
barriers.”253
Non-tariff  barriers can be understood as regulations within a  market  that  make investments for
market  outsiders more difficult  for market insiders,  such as regulations  or production quotas.254
Accordingly, the paragraph above can be understood as the EU trying to reduce any trade barriers,
that hinder investments coming from the EU, while at the same time enforcing regulations and
standards that the EU considers important for environmental economic activity. Given the already
unequal position of negotiation between the EU and e.g. the African Union, it seems likely that the
EU would be able to vastly implement these demands in future trade agreements. The result of this
would be that European investors would be on equal footing with African investors. Given that
European economies are richer than the one's in the African Union, this could potentially lead to a
European dominance in the green investment sector in Africa. This effect would be deepened by
African products not being able to easily fulfill regulations necessary for entering the EU market,
putting them on an even more unequal level. Thus, while the partnership between China and Europe
in environmental issues will be “reinforced“, the EU covertly seeks to enforce it's trade practices in
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agreements  with  the  African  Union.  As  China  most  likely  is  seen  as  a  geopolitically  and
economically stronger actor, the Commission treats the country rethorically differently in the EGD.
It  might  also  be  argued  that  the  EU  deliberately  tries  to  maneuver  African  countries  into
asymmetrical economical relations as a means to ensure further competitive abilities of European
enterprises against US and Chineses businesses, the logic being that since enviromental regulations
and ambitions of sustainability in Europe will harm comapny's profits, theses losses would be offset
by the exploitation of the African market.  
Concludingly,  it  should be noted though taht  the EU finds itself  internationally in  a precarious
situation  regarding  its  ambitions  for  environmental  protection.  Politically  and  economically
powerful countries, such as the US, China, Russia, India, or Brazil, who control a majority of global
resources,  land,  and population  currently do not  show any ambitions  to  intensively commit  to
climate change. While the situation in the US could potentially change under a new government, the
EU  will  generally  face  severe  difficulties  in  gaining  the  support  of  these  nations  for  its
environmental goals. Accordingly, no clearly defined diplomatic strategy can be presented in the
EGD, as these matters are to complex and unforseeable. The African Union might be a different
case, as its member states will suffer consequences of climate change more heavily than states in
other parts of the world. Striving for and establishing a mutually beneficial cooperation with the
African  Union  would  give  Europe  an  important  partner  in  gloablly  promoting  environmental
protection. 
6.5.1 Climate related Migration and Societal Destabilization
Next to questions of unequal opportunities in market participation, another issue that is bound to
affect poorer countries stronger than richer countries, are the destabilizing effects of climate change
on states and societies and the resulting migratorial processes. Climate change will inevitably lead
to  large  scale  migrations  from  affected  areas  to  less  affected  areas.  Through  desertification,
deforestation, inundation, continued rise of natural disasters such as storms and flooding, will lead
to the destruction of livelihoods and communities.255 Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America South Asia
and  many  island  nations,  such  as  Kiribati,  the  Maldives  or  Tuvalu,  will  suffer  unimaginable
damages.256 Estmiates for the number of people affected vary.  While they span 25 Million to 1
billion of people displaced due to natural disasters in 2050, the World Bank forecasts that in the
same year 140 million climate refugees will  exist,  whereas the U.N. Presents a number of 200
255 Heslin, Deckard, Oakes et. al.. Displacement, p. 250; Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 5.
256 Satgar, Climate Crisis, p. 4; Wallace-Wells, Uninhabitable Earth, p. 13.
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million.257 Already in 2016 more than 30 million people suffered internal displacement because of
natural  disasters  in  China,  India,  and  Pakistan.258 Furthermore,  humanitarian  aid  such  as  food,
shelter, or medicine for climate refugees is already insufficent in dry areas such as Somalia, Kenya
or  Ethiopia.259 For  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  processes  of  desertification  are  especially  threatening.
Formerly  fertile  land  is  turned  uninhabitable,  threatening  to  destabilize  states  that  are  already
economically and politically suffering, as they will fail to provide basic services for their citizens.260
In Nigeria, this process contributes to the destruction of villages and to further impoverishment of
the countires northern areas.261 This destabilization and weakening of state structures enabled the
rise of groups such as Boko Haram.262 Dryland areas, that is areas with limited water resources and
scarce, unreliable rainfall, are will also experience a destablization of their environment, since a rise
in temperatures would lead to a higher rate of evaporation of occuring rainfall and an intensification
of tropical storms,  whose rainfall through wind activity  will run off, eroding fertile soil.263 These
processes would affect more than 2 billion people living in these dryland areas, many of them living
in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and southern Africa.264 All of these factors lead to higher numbers
of  displacement  and  migration  in  the  affected  areas,  weakening  communities  even  further  by
lowering their capacity of dealing with climate impacts.265
It remains to be seen how many climate refugees will seek to migrate to the Europe, as the continent
will suffer comparatively less from climate change than Africa or Asia. Still, a safe guess would be
to assume that refugees will surpass the numbers of 2015 in the years to come. Already in 2015 the
number  of  refugees  lead  to  a  series  of  policies  closing  Europe's  outside  borders,  resulting  in
countless deaths in the Mediterranean, were followed by a surge in rightwing populist sentiments
which in turn, pushed the EU into making a deal with Turkey, which the country used multiple
times to politically pressure the EU. These trends are bound to continue under the assumption of
growing  climate  migration  and  displacement.  Additionally,  potentially  new violent  conflicts  in
Africa might entail further military presences on part of the EU and it's member states as is already
the case in Mali, or the Horn of Africa.
The EDG adresses these issues in the following way:
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“ecological  transition will  reshape geopolitics,  including global  economic,  trade and security
interests.  [...]  The  EU  will  work  with  all  partners  to  increase  climate  and  environmental
resilience  to  prevent  these  challenges  from  becoming  sources  of  conflict,  food  insecurity,
population displacement and forced migration. [...] Climate policy implications should become
an integral part of the EU’s thinking and action on external issues, including in the context of the
Common Security and Defence Policy.”266
The issues  is  mainly framed as  a  problem of  security  and economical  interests.  It's  especially
interesting  that  in  response  to  these  issues,  the  EGD  does  not  emphasise  measures  such  as
developmental or humanitarian aid or the exchange of know-how or sepcific channels and areas
through which the establishment of environmental resilence would be realized. Instead of e.g. the
EU's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, the only
EU framewokr mentioned by the EGD is the “Common Security and Defence Policy”, under whose
aegis  a  number  of  military  and  civil  missions,  among  others  the  protection  of  trade  routes  in
Somalia, military consultation in the Central African Republic, or police and security force training
in Libya  or  Mali,  were realized.267 This  hints  at  the EU's  policy of  preventing  migration  from
affected areas in e.g. Africa towards Europe will rely on further military missions, be they in form
of advisory and training missions, or in form of actual armed intervention, instead of economic and
humanitarian aid. This fits the EU's general trend of focussing on military expenditure compared to
humanitarian expenditure. Whereas the initial plans for 2020 foresaw a budget of 900 million € in
humanitarian aid,268 the military budget in 2018 lay at 223 billion €,269 and is said to rise to 300
billion €270 even amidst the ongoing pandemia.271 
It is doubtful that military missions will help in preserving local communities and their traditional
environment,  or  at  alleviating  psycho-social  stressors  that  will  inevitably  originate  from
displacement, the possible lack of a basic standard of living or the prevention of conflict among
people who have to divide scarce resources among themselves. But, as has been said, the only aim
of these measures will be keeping the problem of migration localized to the affected regions, as to
avoid another situation like in the years leading up to 2015. It is of course necessary to help affected
states in strenghtening their security aparatus' to protect civilians from exiting terror organizations
like Boko Haram, or even foreign intervention, like the Russian Wagner Group's activities in Libya,
Central Africa or Sudan, that try to capitalize on countries instability to exert their own influence.272
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But this approach only addresses symptoms of bigger, underlying issues, which in the context of
climate  change  can  only  be  solved  by  aiding  countries  in  mitigating  environmental  harm,  in
providing their  population  with  basic  resources  and helping  them to  accomodate  and integrate
displaced  people  into  new  societal  structures.  Additionally,  if  increased  military  spending  and
activity  is  combinable  with  turning  Europe  into  a  zero-emission  continent  by  2050  remains
questionable.
6.5.2 The Climate Pact
Finally, the fourth section of the EGD “Time to Act – Together: A European Climate Pact” will be
adressed. At its core, the section postulates that “the involvement and commitment of the public and
of  all  stakeholders  is  crucial  to  the  success  of  the  European  Green  Deal.  [...]  Game-changing
policies only work if citizens are fully involved in designing them.”273 It mainly contains general
proposals of how this involvement might be implemented in the future. 
The Climate Pact was to be launched by March 2020 and was to gain public participation on in
climate policies via three means:
“First, it will encourage information sharing, inspiration, and foster public understanding of the
threat and the challenge of climate change and environmental degradation [...]  Second, there
should be both real and virtual spaces for people to express their ideas and creativity [...]Third,
the Commission will  work on building capacity to facilitate  grassroots initiatives on climate
change and environmental protection.”
As  of  now,  August  2020,  the  Climate  Pact  consists  of  a  web  page,  explaining  its  goals  and
proclaiming “the European Climate Pact will be launched in the last quarter of 2020.”274 The page
also lists two events from the 15.06.2020 and the 14.07.2020 for organisations that were inetrested
in cooperating with the EU under the framework of the Climate Pact. Since the EGD calls for the
empowerment  of  “regional  and local  communities”  and through the  Urban  Inivitaive  wants  to
support cities in constructing “sustainable urban development strategies”,275 the page also suggests
that the “Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy” could be used as a platform for citizen
participation in climate policy. Lastly, the Commission wants to “improve access to administrative
and judicial review at EU level for citizens and NGOs who have concerns about the legality of
decisions  with  effects  on  the  environment.”  For  this,  the  Commission  already  established  the
273 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 22.
274 European Commission, European Climate Pact.
275 The following quotes can all be found under European Green Deal, p. 23.
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“Better Regulation Portal” where during certain time frames, EU citizens can leave comments on
upcomming legislature.276 It is undeniably important to incorporate citizens in the decision making
processes of the EU and offer more transparecy to them by communicating which policies  are
planned. The question is, if comments by average citizens will actually be paid heed. Furthermore,
many citizens lack experience in legislative procedures and the formulation of laws, so even if EU
institutions would be willing to receive and evaluate feedback, it is unlikely that “normal” citizens
would be able to substantially affect climate policy, especially given its highly complex nature. It is
therefore more likely, that the tools the Commission proposed and plans to establish will mainly be
useful  to  NGOs,  companies,  and  institutions  that  have  experience  in  the  EU's  legislature,  the
capacity  of  analysing  and  reformulating  laws,  as  well  as  an  indepth  understanding  of  the
environment and global climate change.
6.6 What is Lacking?
By now, it should be clear that the EGD is, in certain areas, a problematic paper. On the one hand,
its  possibilities  are  severly  limited  by  the  EU's  political  constitution,  as  well  as  by  the  the
difficulties of introducing a worldwide shift in environmental politics. Though to solve these issues,
the Commission lacks the power and cannot be held responsible for shortcomings in these areas. On
the other hand, and here the Commission does have the option to choose different approaches, the
deal  often  times  seems to  subtly defend and strengthen the  position  of  economically  powerful
actors, e.g. in the transportation and agricultural sector, or in the EU's trade policies towards Africa,
thus counteracting its proclaimed objective of promoting a “just transition”.
But before giving a more detailed conclusion at the end of this thesis about the adequacy and the
implications the EGD's content, a quick assessment has to be made regarding the question if the
Commission's strategy addresses a wide enough array of problems that will be caused by climate
change. As has been shown, the deal covers multiple issues related to environmental deterioiation.
The EGD promises measures and stratgies for raising ambitions to reduce emissions to net-zero by
2050,  which  is  in  line  with  current  scientific  assessment  to  not  surpass  the  Paris  Agreement's
temperature limits, for the implementation of the UN's sustainability goals, for transforming the
energy sector, as well as the economical and industrial sector towards a sustainable economy, for
emission  reduction  in  transport  and  mobility,  for  healthier,  environmentally  friendlier  food
production,  for  the  restoration  of  biodiversity  and the  reduction  of  toxic  byproducts  that  enter
nature,  as  well  as  aiming  to  mobilise  funding  for  environmental  research  and  the  general
276 European Commission, Better Regulation Portal.
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transformation of European society towards environmental protection. Even some promises have
been made in regards of furthering citizen's participation in the European political processes. As has
been shown, these measures on a first read appear more promising than they might turn out to be.
But it cannot be denied that the EGD covers nearly every topic relevant to a more environmentally
friendly Europe, even adressing issues like garbage disposal and biodiversity, which are not strictly
related to GHG emission and are therefore are not directly contributing to global heating.
Nevertheless, some important aspects are lacking. The first mentionalbe omission concerns urban
areas. Urban areas and zones themselves have been, of course, mentioned multiple times within the
EGD, but never as a separate entity that would merrit an own strategy to face climate change. As
these  areas  through  heating,  transport  pollution,  inundations,  destruction  of  biodiversity  via
construction,  and  growing  urbanisation  are  especially  connected  to  climate  change,  a  separate
subchapter should have existed to propose measures for the transformation of urban lifestyle and
environments. The need for these kind of strategies and proposals for their focuses and realisation
were for example laid out by Juhola and Boyd.277 
Another set of ideas that is lacking are specific proposals to generally increase resilence against
environmental changes in Europe. No strategy has been proposed of how to strengthen European
communisties in regards to flood protection, increased health risks, coping with heat, drought and
water scarcity etc. Some of these aspects are certainly be covered in the “Farm to Fork” strategy,
but for the general population, no precautions or measures have been mentioned. Of course the
sectors  covered  by  the  deal  are  in  some  way  or  another  related  to  resilence  and  would,  if
implemented correctly,  reduce  the need for  further  resilence.  But  given that  the  deal  will  only
contribute to lowering global warming, not preventing it, it still should offer more help in warding
off these exact consequences. 
Finally, while the deal proposes to further fund research and education, and calls for the display of
more  health  and climate  related  information  on consumer  products,  it  does  not  consider  the  a
informational  campaign  to  further  educate  European  citizens  on  climate  change  and  its
consequences, to not only help them in their choices as consumers, but to also motivate them to
reduce environmentally damaging behaviour,  such as car or plane travel,  tourim in general,  the
consumption of animal products etc. As matters of education are handled by the member state, this
campaign of course could only be funded by the EU and would have to operate on the basis of
voluntary participation by citizens. But an effort in this regard should at least be made, to also raise
political awarness and pressure in member states to change their given national policies. Lastly, a
recent study by  Dubois, Sovacool,  Aall  et  al.  suggests that suggests that only through “'forced'
277 Juhola & Boyd, Adaptive climate change, p. 1235 ff.
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solutions”  households  were  actually  encouraged  to  reduce  emissions  by  behavioural  and
consumption changes, and that voluntary measures do not suffice.278
7. The Circular Economy Action Plan
To better understand the economical thinking behind the EGD, a look needs to be taken at  the
Commission's  “new Circular Economy Action Plan For a cleaner and more competitive Europe“.
This will not be realized in as much detail as was the case for the EGD or the investment plan.
Rather, the analysis will focus on what the Commission envisions as circularity, and if this concept
would really be able to achieve “decoupling economic growth from resource use, while ensuring the
long-term competitiveness of the EU and leaving no one behind“.279 As this strategy will be the
basis for the necessary transformation of the European economy, it's success will be inevitable for
achieving European climate neutrality by 2050. 
It should be mentioned that already in December 2015, the Commission launched it's first circular
economy Action plan , which in recent years has been updated with a monitoring framework and
reports on the success of implementing first transformative strategies, and aimed at strengthening
the economy while protecting the environment.280
There exists no unified, scholary consensus on how to actually define the CE.281 Some of the most
popular approaches and contents though will be layed out in the following. At its core, the CE aims
at  transforming  waste  products  of  the  traditional  linear  economy  into  valuable  resources,  by
recycling and recovering it for different or multiple production cycles, thus raising the efficiency of
resource usage.282 To quote a definition proposed by Baran, the CE follows three principles:  
“preserving and enhancing natural capital (through the regulated usage of available resources, 
and the balance of renewable resource flows); optimising resource yields (which means that re-
manufacturing, refurbishing and maintenance are well planned, in order to make materials a part 
of economic processes for as long as possible); and fostering system effectiveness (to minimise 
negative externalities and eliminate toxic substances, by either replacing or reducing them, for 
example choosing appropriate materials, thus leading to waste reduction or replacing fossilised 
energy resources by renewable ones).“
Additionally,  according  to  a  meta-study,  core  values  espoused  by  definitions  of  the  CE  are
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“environmental sustainability, economic prosperity, and social equity.“283 An equally important part
of scholary definitions is played by the necessity of reducing consumption and changing consumer
behaviour.284
Though the Commissions CE strategy does not offer its own definition, all of these concepts are
more or less covered within the paper by proposing different sets of strategies and methods to
transform the European economies. Reducing consumption might be an exception, though changing
consumer behaviour is at least adressed indirectly.
The Commission itself presents a simple reasoning for adopting a CE model:
“There is only one planet Earth, yet by 2050, the world will be consuming as if there were three. 
Global consumption of materials [...] is expected to double in the next forty years, while annual 
waste generation is projected to increase by 70% by 2050. [...] The EU needs to accelerate the 
transition towards a regenerative growth model that gives back to the planet more than it takes, 
advance towards keeping its resource consumption within planetary boundaries, and therefore 
strive to reduce its consumption footprint and double its circular material use rate in the coming 
decade.”285
While  this  statement  only indirectly  hints  at  the  problem of  a  growing  global  population  and
especially growing global middle-class consumption, it adresses the issue of the insufficiency of a
linear economic growth model in the face of the earth's limited resource capacities.286 As of 2019,
only  9% of  the  global  economy was  structured  circularily,  even  though  modern  technological
possibilities make the contemporary system of simply disposing waste products more and more
uneconomical.287 This  issue  is  also  adressed  by  the  Commission  which  claims  “that  applying
circular economy principles across the EU economy has the potential to increase EU GDP by an
additional 0.5% by 2030 creating around 700 000 new jobs“, citing pages 38 and 39 of the „Impacts
of circular economy policies on the labour market“ study by Cambridge Econometrics, Trinomics,
and  ICF.288 While  the  report  points  out  that  the  jobs  would  mainly  be  created  in  the  waste
management sector, without mentioning which if these employments would consist of mainly low-
skill or high-skill labour, and that there would even be a decrease in jobs in the consturction sector,
the  Commission  conveniently  leaves  out  these  caveats.289 Other  studies,  such  as  by  Morić,
Jovanović,  Đoković  et  al.  or  Sverko  Grdic,  Nizic  &  Rudan,  paint  a  similar  picture  though,
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presenting evidence for more profitability of the circular economic model,290 as well as a growth of
the European GDP of up to 3.9% while using 17% to 24% less resources in this time frame if the
policies were to be implemented coherently.291
The Commission proposes  a  vast  array of  measures  to  restructure the European economy in a
circular way. As these are, at their core, very similar to each other, only a basic summary for the
different sectors will be given, as to point out the conceptual basis of the strategy. In the paper,
within the chapter “A sustainable Product Policy Framework”, the Comission itself already gives a
general summary of measures to be implemented. These include
“improving product durability, reusability, upgradability and reparability, addressing the presence
of hazardous chemicals in products, and increasing their energy and resource efficiency; 
increasing recycled content in products, while ensuring their performance and safety; enabling 
remanufacturing and high-quality recycling; reducing carbon and environmental footprints;  
restricting single-use and countering premature obsolescence;  introducing a ban on the 
destruction of unsold durable goods; incentivising product-as-a-service or other models where 
producers keep the ownership of the product or the responsibility for its performance throughout 
its lifecycle;  mobilising the potential of digitalisation of product information, including solutions
such as digital passports, tagging and watermarks; rewarding products based on their different 
sustainability performance, including by linking high performance levels to incentives”292
Priority for implementing these policies will be given to  “product groups [...] such as electronics,
ICT and textiles but also furniture and high impact intermediary products such as steel, cement and
chemicals”, i.e. products that throughout their production cycle demand a high investment of energy
and resources.293 Some specific measures, e.g. for electronic devices, include regulations for energy
efficiency, durability, recycling, or a “'right to repair'”.294 Similar measures can be found addressing
batteries  and vehicles.295 Further  important  areas  mentioned by the  Commission are  packaging,
which is planned to be generally reduced and recycled more often;296 plastics, where a special focus
is put on reducing the usage of and the environmental exposure to microplastics, and the promotion
of biodegradable plastics;297 textiles, where business regualtions and sustainability throughout the
global production chains are planned to be improved, as well as the collection of textile waste in
member states;298 and lastly construction and building, where the prevention of soil sealing and the
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environmental recovery of abandoned building areas are additionally mentioned.299 Furthermore, the
Commission introduces further objectives to reduce the production of waste, to further recycling
and to create a “well-functioning EU market for secondary raw materials”,  where these unused
waste-resources or second-hand materials will be able to compete with “fresh” resources.300 In a
similar vain, the Commission wants to inhibit waste export to non-Eu countries with lower waste
treatment regulations than exist within the EU, though one major motivation for this might rather be
“import restrictions introduced by some third countries”.301 Like in the EGD, the Commission in its
CE strategy aims to increase information about production processes for consumers in a way that
consumers will be able to assess a products ecological footprint.302 Issues surrounding these plans
have been adressed in the discussion of the EGD itself.
In  summary,  the  Commission  considers  a  broad  array  of  areas  wherein  circularity  has  to  be
implemented for environmental protection and generally presents solutions that would be helpful in
solving these issues. Of course the strategies success depends on how thouroughly and effectively it
will be implemented and as with the EGD, restrictions and reservations exist in regard of how
willing member states are to implement these strategies, as the EU itself can only dictate market
rules and regulations. But the general direction of the strategy seems sufficient. Considering that
studies  promise economic  growth and profits,  it  seems further  likely that  the Commission and
companies have an actual inetrest in implementing certain regulations and transformative steps.
A few doubts on the conceptual level remain though: Can economical growth really be separated
from resource usage; and how valuable are CE plans for Europe alone in a globalized economy.
Before addressing the second reservation, which the Commission discusses in its paper, the first
point will be discussed.
As  has  been  pointed  out,  studies  suggest  economical  growth under  the  implementation  of  CE
strategies until 2030 between 0.5% and 3.9%. This is a relatively short time frame and considering
that there is still a lot of inefficient wastage within the linear economy, it seems logical that through
different measures of optimisation, more profit and growth can be reached within this period. But
what about the decades afterwards? If completly and perfectly realized, the CE would consist of
recycling nearly everything, leaving no waste behind and barely any further resource exploitation.
The majority of  materials  would  be reused over  and over  again.  Even though this  might  only
develop in the long-term and keeping the problem of a globally entangled economy aside for a
moment, this should, logically, lead to economic stagnation, as nothing would enter or leave the
299 Ibid. p. 11.
300 Ibid. p. 13f.
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302 Ibid. p. 5.
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economic circle, especially keeping in mind that the European population is decreasing, if this trend
is not balanced out by migration. This, of course, would be the perfect result for environmental
protection and would only benefit the EU's 2050 environmental neurtality goals. The only apparent
solution  to  this  seems to  continue  the  growth of  European companies  outside  of  Europe,  thus
establishing a circular economy within Europe,  while continuing the traditional linear model in
other parts of the world. While the Commission is correct in claiming that CE strategies will further
growth in the next ten years, there is a lack of scientific research on what the situation will look like
in twenty or thirty years or on how long the transformation towards circularity will take. 
Another criticism of the assumption that growth and material usage can be decoupled, stems from
Giorgos Kallis. In an article about dematerialization he challenges this tenet, without specifically
mentioning  the  term  “circular  economy”  though.  Central  to  his  argument  is  the  idea  that  the
reduction of resource usage will always lead to a slowdown, if not to a hold or even reversal of
economic growth. He postulates “that radical dematerialization is not compatible with economic
growth”.303
At a base level, Kallis describes the economy as a process, wherein raw materials and energy are
transformed  into  goods,  services,  and  waste.304 For  the  energy  sector  specifically,  to  achieve
economic growth, the investment of energy should result in a return of energy that is higher than the
original  investment,  e.g.  the  drilling  of  oil  should  make more  fuel  accessible  than  energy was
necessary to extract it.305 As for the time being, Kallis posits that extracting and using fossil fuels
still yields higher net energy than the usage of renewables.306 One might argue though, that through
technological progress the efficiency rate of renewables will rise and surpass the efficiency of fossil
fuels. This would be similar as to how growth had been achieved in the past: reinvesting profits into
new technologies,  that  use  materials  and energy more  efficiently and therefore  produce  higher
return rates on investments.307 
But Kallis counters this argument by citing the  “'Jevons paradox'”, according to which a raise in
resource usage effiency usually leads to even more resource usage.308 Resources that are used more
efficiently, become cheaper, which in turn increases their usage, as companies are able to buy more
of them to increase the output of end products.309 Similar things can be observed in the field of
labour, where an increase in productivity historically has lead to more, not less employement.310
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While  an  increase  in  efficiency  reduces  material  usage  and  enable  the  saving  of  energy  and
resources, it usually is the case that these savings are reinvested, leading to more growth.311 Thus,
despite massive progress in the efficiency of resource usage,  material  usage more than doubled
since 1980.312 One might argue that it would be legally possible to prevent an increase in material
usage and only rely on growth produced by resource and energy savings. But this would in the long
run lead to economic stagnation as the ever  same amount  of materials  would be used without
enabling the reinvestment of the savings, which is quintessential for economic growth. This would,
in turn, contradict the Commissions claims for the possibilities of CE.
Lastly, the issue of globality should be addressed. A CE model is only as efficient as its scope.
Implementing perfect circularity within Europe would not only require shutting of the European
economy from other,  non-circular  economies,  as  only this  way value  chains  and resource  and
material trajectories could be fully monitored, but also neccesitate resource autarky of the EU on a
level, that would seriously degrade the current standard of living, which the Commission likely
wants to prevent. For the European economy to continue to grow under the conditions of circularity
therefore would require the continued linerity of economies outside of Europe, which again would
negate the effects of having a CE in Europe. Therefore, a global push for circularity is necessary to
bring into full effectiveness of the CE transformation. For this similar problems exist as with the
implementation and the goals of the EGD. The Commission plans to reach global agreements on
plastic usage, on the basis of governance build a “Global Circular Economy Alliance”, couple CE
regulations with trade agreements, and realize “bilateral, regional and multilateral policy dialogues,
fora and environmental agreements”.313 It seems therefore that the success of the CE, just like with
the EGD, depends to a high degree on the willingness of international partners to implement similar
strategies. Yet again, a word has also to be said about the EU's plans for Africa. Accroding to the
strategy the Commission wants to “build a stronger partnership with Africa to maximise the benefits
of  the  green  transition  and  the  circular  economy”.314 As  African  economies  are  largely not  as
polluting  as  European  economies,  and  a  “Green  Transition”  would  more  likely  be  the  further
development of already green economies, this statement leaves room for questioning. Specifically
keeping in mind the analysis of EU trade policies mentioned in the EGD, one might assume that
possible economic stagnation in Europe caused through circularity in the long run, might not be off-
set by asymmetrical exploitation of the African market through European companies.
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8. The “Sustainable Europe Investment Plan. European Green Deal Investment Plan”
As has been pointed out multiple times by now, by and large, the EGD is strongly concerned with
transforming key economical sectors. This, of course, is based on the fact that the current structure
of  the  European  economy,  via  production,  processing  and  consumption  of  resources,  energy,
agriculture etc., is what drives environmental degradation. Furthermore, this is caused by the EU
institutions  legislative  competences  mainly  being  restricted  to  economical  questions.  While
economic regulations and standards as a tool for the restructuring of the economy are mentioned not
too sparingly, investments can be considered the major feature of the EGD. Numerically, words
related to this area appear 45 times within the EGD, compared to 33 words related to regulations. A
two-page subchapter of the deal is dedicated to investments specifically.  Furthermore, the first plan
of realising key aspects of the EGD to be presented after the deal itself was announced, was the
“Sustainable Europe Investment Plan. European Green Deal Investment Plan”, published on the 14th
of January 2020. The plan is described as 
“the investment pillar of the European Green Deal. A sustainable Europe requires significant
investment  effort  across  all  sectors  of  the  economy.  […]  Additional  investments  will  be
necessary for achieving the broader environmental and social  objectives that  the EU has set
itself”
and further promises to  “mobilise through the EU budget and the associated instruments at least
EUR  1  trillion  of  private  and  public  sustainable  investments  over  the  upcoming decade.”315
Alongside the investment plan came the proposal for the specifics of a “Just Transition Fund” as
part  of  a  “Just  Transition  Mechanism”.  In  the  EGD,  the  mechanism described  as  "part  of  the
Sustainable Europe Investment Plan", that will  
“leave no one behind.  The transition can only succeed if it is conducted in a fair and inclusive
way. [...] At the same time, managing the transition will lead to significant structural changes in
business models, skill requirements and relative prices. Citizens, depending on their social and
geographic circumstances, will be affected in different ways.”
The mechanism further will mostly focus on “regions and sectors that are most affected by the
transition because they depend on fossil fuels or carbon-intensive processes.[...] Support will be
linked to promoting a transition towards low-carbon and climate-resilient activities.”316 Thus, while
315 Both quotes to be found under Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, p.1.
316 Both quotes to be found under European Green Deal, p. 16.
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mentioning  citizens  and  their  specific  vulnerabilities,  the  mechanisms  mainly  target  the
maintenance of economic activity and economic growth in sectors and regions, whose prospering
heavily depends on environmentally damaging activities.
As  the  mechanisms  and  policies  of  investment  are  allocated  such  a  high  importance  by  the
Commission, it is evident that they merit a profound analysis. Principally, the investment plan with
raising and allocating funds to achieve the promised number of  one trillion euro. Similarly,  the
Proposal for the Just Transition Mechanism talks about the source, size, and allocation of monetary
investments. These proceedings have, shortly after their announcement, already been analysed by
various sources, among others the Brussels European and Global Economic Laboratory thinktank
(Bruegel),  whose results  and positions will  be introduced in the following pages. This includes
analysing the sources of the one trillion euro proposed by the Commission, as well as taking a
closer  look  at  the  planned  Just  Transition  Fund,  evnvisioned  as  part  of  the  Just  Transition
Mechanism. Since for  the fund there already exists  a  detailed plan of  the source,  amount,  and
allotment of financial aids, it will be the part of the Just Transition Mechanism that is principally
analysed. But more importantly, a look will be taken at what some of the suggested measure will
mean politically for the EU and which countries and areas might be the main beneficiaries of these
plans, an issue, which has not received too much of a focus yet and to whose solution both plans
already contain an answer. There are indicators that point at both plans containing concessions or
acommodations for coal producing countries to support the EGD by being allocated EU funds.
Additionally,  in regards to the investment plan,  the future role  of Blackrock in supervising the
integration of sustainability into the European banking sector, will receive a critical look. Finally,
this  analysis  will  only focus on some key issues since the investment plans are at  times rather
complex. Dealing with every proposal and implication of the plan would merit a paper on it's own
and cannot be realized within this work.
8.1 One Trillion Euro of Sustainable Investments
The Commission itself acknowledges that to reach the EGD's precursor emission reductions of 40%
compared to 1990, additional investments of 260 billion euro are required.317 Interestingly enough,
the  original  text  reads:  “Reaching  the  2030  climate  and  energy targets  will  require  additional
investments of EUR 260 billion a year by 2030” which at first reading seems to indicate the target
of  a  55%  reduction  announced  by  the  EGD,  especially  since  the  deal  is  mentioned  just  two
317 Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, p. 1.
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sentences before.318 Only a footnote clarifies that the phrase refers to the former, lower targets. It
can be assumed that this was a deliberate decision to downplay the number of actual additional
investetmenst needed. Bruegel estimates that in reality at least 300 billion euro of additional yearly
funds until 2030 are necessary.319 This would add up to three trillion euro, threefold the amount
promised by the investment plan.  One has to keep in mind though that the Commission's  only
financial source is the MFF, which will only be renogiated in 2021 and requires the agreement of
every Council member. Accordingly, the Commission will have to find a balance between a sum
that is sufficiently high enough to at least somewhat enable the fullfillment of it's goals, and at the
same time low enough that more frugal memberstates will approve of it. Bruegel therefore suggests,
that the lacking two trillion euro have to be invested through national governments and the private
sector. It should be noted that the investment plan does not mention to which sectors specifically the
money will  be  allocated,  as  the  plan  is  mainly concerned with establishing  the  framework for
mobilising the money and the mechanisms for it's allocation.
Due to the aformentioned reasons, the EU budget until 2030 will only allocate 503 billion euro to
achieve the 55% goal,  for which the MFF spending regarding sustainability and environmental
protection is to be raised to 25%.320 As the Commission claims “this will trigger additional national
co-financing of  EUR 114 billion over  this  timeframe on climate  and environment”.321 Bruegel
points out one would be mistaken to classify the 503 billion euro as filling part of the three trillion
euro investment gap, since many of these expenditures do not represent actual investments, but are
part of financing programmes providing e.g. farming subsidies or innovation funding. Furthermore,
past  experiences  give  cause  for  pessimism regarding  the  effectivness  of  these  kind  of  budget
expenditures. In 2017 EU auditors analysing subsidies intended to steer farmers towards a “green”
agriculture,  found  that  often  times  they  received  payments  for  measures  they  would  have
undertaken either way. Payments were simply handed out without any critical oversight over their
allocation and usage.322 This could happen in every sector the EU plans to invest in.
The comission furthermore, lays out that 20% of the revenues made by the EU's Emissions Trading
System,  estimated  at  around 25 billion  Euro,  will  be  used  as  investments  during  the  next  ten
years.323 The ETS, of course, has the advantage of not being part of the EU's budget and it's funds
can therefore be more easily distributed by the Commission. As has been pointed out already, the
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319 Every of the following information can, unless marked differently, be found under Claeys & Tagliapietra, A Trillion
Reasons.
320 Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, p. 6.
321 Ibid.
322 Harvey & Rankin, What is the European Green Deal
323 Ibid.
60
ETS is not functining as well as it should be, as revenues of the ETS depend on carbon pricing, and
as of yet the Commission has not announced any plans to stabilize carbond prices or at least not let
them sink any further.
Through the Just Transition Mechanism, which is supposed to add 7.5 billion euro to the exisiting
MFF, the Commission plans to  “mobilize investment  in  the regions  most  exposed to  transition
challenges in the order of EUR 100 billion over the period 2021-2027”, which “extrapolated over
10 years, will reach EUR 143 billion to ensure a just transition”.324 The exact functioning of the Just
Tranistion Mechanism, especially the Just Transition Fund, will  be anaylsed later on as well.  It
should  already be  noted  though,  that  the  Mechanism will  consist  of  45  billion  euro  provided
through the InvestEU mechanism. 
The  InvestEU  programme  was  laid  out  as  unifying  different  financial  instruments  of  the  EU
supporting  investments  under  a  common  framework.325 InvestEU  draws  on  the  Juncker  Plan's
European Fund for Strategic Investments and similarily aims at guaranteeing support for investors
within  the  EU.  The  programme  is  planned  to  leverage  650  billion  euro  in  public  and  private
investments during the 2021 to 2027 MFF period, 279 billion euro of which are counted towards the
Commissions goal of one trillion euro.326 In connection with the Just Transition Mechanism the
question arises if the 45 billion euro that InvestEU is supposed to contirbute to the Just Transition
Mechanism are counted in  the 279 billion euro,  and if  therefore the commission is  commiting
double counting, as Bruegel suggests. The thinkank further points out that already in May 2018 the
Commission  proposed  to  use  InvestEU  as  a  tool  to  mobilise  investments  for  climate-related
enterprises, which the Council and the EP agreed upon in April 2019. Therefore, the money offered
by InvestEU for reducing emissions cannot be considered as an additional source of filling the 3
trillion euro investment gap, since the funds must already have been part of the baseline scenario.
Regarding InvestEU, the Sustainable Investment Plan contains some other interesting remarks as
well.  While this money would yet again not originate directly from the EU's budget and could
therefore be more easily allocated by the Commission, the programme is also supposed to help
investors “by providing an EU budget guarantee to reduce the risk in financing and investment
operations.”327 As “Some investments needed for the transition entail more risk than the private
sector  can bear  alone.  This  is  where public  funds can be used in  a  targeted manner  to  de-risk
projects and leverage private financing.”328 Therefore, to partially cover the risks of investors, the
Commission wants to issue “an EU guarantee of EUR 38 billion. This guarantee is supported by a
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325 European Commission, InvestEU.
326 Ibid.; Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, p. 6 and 8.
327 Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, p. 6.
328 Ibid., p. 8.
61
combination  of  an EU budget  of  EUR 15.2 billion  and contingent  liabilities  for  the  remaining
amount.”329 Accordingly, the EU will provide at least 15.2 billion euro of it's budget to investors if
their enterprises in trying to establish sustainable businesses and a sustainable transformation of
economic sectors fail, while additional payments of the guarantee will depend on how badly the
situation will turn out. Restructuring the European economy towards complete sustainability and
zero-emission objectives during the next thirty years will, of course, be a costly and for investors
economically difficult undertaking. By offering them a safety-net and thus encouraging more daring
investments, one would suppose that the Commission proposes a sensitive policy. But a few caveats
have to be raised towards this assumption.
Firstly, it should be addressed that even though the EU explains that by providing these guarantees
risk will be shifted from private economical actors to the EU budget, this by extension also means
that the European public will be liable to pay these investors should their enterprise not turn out to
be profitable,  as  Adler  and Varoufakis  point  out.330 Though it  can be argued that  the proposed
guarantee of 38 billion euro would not put too much of a strain on European taxpayers, especially if
compared to other payments that have been financed by taxpayer money in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis.
The  second  point  of  criticism can  be  directed  towards  the  investment  plan  in  general.  As  the
proposal  itself  states  “private  companies  and  households  will  have  to  provide  the  bulk  of  the
sustainable investments in the next decade”.331 Not only will the EU delegate responsiblities in a
matter that is of such relevance to the future of the planet's habitability to actors, who have not been
democratically legitimized, and do not have to answer to the public about mishaps and malpractices,
but by doing so the EU will lose a critical amount of control over these transformative processes.
One can counter these concerns by pointing out that simply because of it's size and the complexity
of the matter at hand, a more centralized framework, with more control through EU institutions
would cause even more harm and ultimately fail in producing the best possible results. Furthermore,
the investment plan contains a passage stating that the 
“Commission will put forward a climate tracking methodology for measuring the contribution of
specific financing and investment operations to the climate and environmental objectives of the
programme.[...]  Promoters  of  projects  above  a  certain  size  will  be  required  to  assess  the
environmental, climate and social impact of those projects. As these methods will be applied by
all InvestEU Implementing Partners […] and will also be the reference point for private investors
and  financial  intermediaries  participating  in  the  programme,  they  are  expected  to  spill-over
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beyond the InvestEU Programme.”332
Some form of assessment of sustainability for investment will therefore exist. How effective these
mechanisms will be remains to be seen, especially as they only apply to investments under the
InvestEU programme and are only “expected to spill  over“ outside the programme. Within the
frame of  a  liberal  market  society,  decentralizing efforts  and trying to  steer  them into  the right
direction are the only instruments the EU institutions have at their disposal. In addition, a paper by
Short and Toffel found implications that a combination between heavy regulatory surveillance and
commitments to self-regulation provide satisfactory results in organisations sticking to their self-
regulations.333 Therefore to make sure the InvestEU programme actually realizes the objectives it
postulates, the accompanying control-mechanisms have to constructed very thouroughly, and would
have  to  be  applied  expansively.  Additionally,  private  actors  applying  for  the  funds  should
communicate their plans and actions to the public transparently to add to the democratization of the
process.
All in all, is the amount of money foreseen by the investment plan sufficient and will it's sources
produce reliable results? One major problem, as was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, is
that the promised one trillion euro will not be sufficient to reach the EU's climate targets for 2030.
The Commission does not state this directly and tries to conceal this fact by using the outdated
reduction targets as a baseline for establishing lacking funds, so it can only be guessed how much
investment would actually be necessary. But even calculating with these numbers, one would end
up with a sum of 2.6 trillion lacking to reach the objectives, more than double of the one trillion
euro  the  Commission  promises  mobilise.  Additionally,  for  reaching  the  promised  sum,  the
Commission has to trust in estimating future investments by private actors, which further muddies
the reliability of the announced numbers, as well  as putting into question the transparency and
democratic legitimacy of these actions. In case of the InvestEU programme, the funds, at least in
part, will be established from money, that currently pertains to other programmes within the same
framework. It's usage, therefore, would not add anything to overcome the investment gap. Finally,
revenues coming from the ETS would only represent a meaningful source for investments,  if a
sufficently high, possibly fixed, price for GHG emissions existed.
Another critical point, formulated by Adler and Varoufakis, adresses the apparent failure of the EU
institutions to make available sufficently high funds in a short amount of time for finding a solution
to such a critical issue, as there exists recent evidence that faster and bigger reactions have been
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realized within the EU.334 When the financial crisis struck Europe, the EU's banking sector was
provided 4.3 trillion euros in the inmediate aftermath, whereas for a crisis of existential dimensions,
only one trillion euro over ten years will be mobilised.335 As the Bank of Spain in a footnote of their
analysis of the EU interventions in favour of the banking sector points out, the 4.3 trillion euro were
only provisionally approved, and therefore were only “potentially available authorised volumes and
not to amounts actually used, which stood at around €1.2 trillion, of which amount €757 billion are
guarantees that were granted and not necessarily realised”.336 It seems to be telling though, that
reducing  EU  emissions  does  not  even  provisionally  merit  the  allotment  of  the  3  trillion  euro
necessary. Yet again, it has to be kept in mind that the Commission is limited in it's actions by the
necessitiy of unanimity among Council members and parliamentary approval regarding budgetary
questions  for  the  upcoming  fiscal  discussions.  While  during  the  financial  crash,  the  market
interventions  were  seen  as  away  to  stabilize  the  European  economies  and  were  already
accompanied  by severe  political  disruptions  about  the  question  under  which  conditions  and  if
southern European countries should at  all  receive parts of the financial  aids,  the EGD's aim of
restructuring  the  economy  towards  a  more  sustainable  model  could  at  first  potentially  stunt
economic  growth  in  some  European  countries.  Any  political  and  financial  measure  going  too
strongly into that direction will face severe backlash by any party within the EP and by Council
members  that  espouse  populist  narratives  and/or  defend  radical  non-interventionist  laissez-fair
economics,  or  that  represent  a  poorer  member-state,  which  depends  on  unstunted  growth  and
economical development. 
8.2 The Just Transition Fund
As has been mentioned, the Just Transition Mechanism aims at supporting the structural changes in
territories,  whose economy depends on industries  harmful  to  the  environment.  The mechanism
consist of three pillars, aiming at mobilising 100 billion euro of investment. Of these pillars, the Just
Transition Fund is currently the most flashed out and will therefore mainly be considered in the
following analysis. Next to the fund, InvestEU is supposed to invest in 45 billion euro into projects
related to just transition.337 This, as stated above, might be an instance of double counting, were the
45 billion euro are counted as part of InvestEU and as part of the Just Transition Mechanism in
contributing to the onre trillion euro investment goal. The establishment of a facility within the EIB,
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partly guaranteed by the EU budget, will further provide 25 to 30 billion euro of investment.338
Of the coming EU budget, 7.5 billion euro will be dedicated to the Just Transition Fund, which
“will aim to alleviate the social and economic costs of the transition to climate neutrality“ and offer
“support for bridging differences between and inside of Member States.“339 Eligible for access to the
fund are “territories with high employment in coal, lignite, oil shale and peat production, as well as
territories with greenhouse gas-intensive industries, which will be either discontinued or severely
impacted by the transition.“ 
According to Bruegel, the following formula will be used to determine the amount of money a
country could potentially receive: the carbon intensity of it's NUTS-2 regions, i.e. Medium-sized
regions and bigger cities, would be weighted by 49%; employment numbers in the mining of coal
and lignite would be weigthed by 25%; employment in the industrial economy would be weighted
by 25%; the production of peat would be weighted by 0.95%, and lastly, the production of oil shale
would be weighted by 0.05%.340 The Commission already provided a sheet detailing how much
every EU member state will receive out of the fund, based on all of these factors combined with
each other. It will suffice to only name the top five beneficiaries, as they amount to 62.4% or 4.678
billion euro of the fund's budget. Poland will receive 26.7% or 2 billion euro, Germany will receive
11.7% or 877 million euro, Romania will recieve 10.1% or 757 million euro, the Czech Republic
will receive 7.7% or 581 million euro, and Bulgaria will receive 6.1% or 458 million euro.341 Given
these numbers, it seems very clear that the fund was originally designed to convince countries in
Eastern Europe, who depend on emission heavy industry and were therefore sceptical of the EGD,
to back the emission reduction targets.342 Poland, specifically, in December refused to accept the
zero-emission by 2050 target.343 But as the situation currently stands, Poland might lose 50% of the
funds it  was promised as European Council  President Charles Michel’s proposal for a new EU
budget states  “For member states that have not yet committed to a national objective of climate
neutrality by 2050, access to the Just  Transition Fund will  be limited to 50% of their  national
allocation”.344 Disregarding these developments, because of another of its characteristics, the fund
can be characterized as a fiscal gift to Poland, Germany, Czechia, and Bulgaria. The investment
plan states:
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“To unlock one euro from the Just  Transition Fund, each Member State  will  be required to
allocate a minimum of 1.5 and a maximum of 3 euro from the European Regional Development
Fund  and  the  European  Social  Fund  Plus.  This  spending  from  the  EU  budget  will  be
supplemented by national co-financing according to cohesion policy rules. This could bring the
total amount of public funds mobilised through the Just Transition Fund to between EUR 30 and
50 billion”345
Thus, to achieve money from the fund, member states have to re-allocate money from their ERDF
and ESF+ to projects the fund is supposed to support. To comply with the EU's cohesion policy, that
is trying to achieve a reduction of economic disparities between regions within the EU, member
states will have to co-finance projects for territories in other states. As Bruegel explains,
“it is naïve, or even misleading, to claim that the funds devoted to the JTF will be additional to 
the EU budget, given that the first stage of the MFF negotiations is focused on agreeing on an 
overall headline number. This means that once an agreement is finally reached, the JTF will fall 
under this aggregate number and therefore the amount devoted to the JTF will mechanically 
reduce the funds devoted to other programmes.”346
Based on this assumption,  Bruegel compiled a table showing the amount of redistribution from
ERDF and ESF+ envelopes  and of co-financing each country would have to undertake for the
financing of the the fund and projects related to it. This table shows, that after re-allocation and
after receiving their shares in the fund and financiation through the cohesion policies, four principal
benefactors would emerge:  Poland, Germany, Czechia, and Bulgaria, while Italy, Spain, Portugal
and Hungary would suffer through this re-allocation.347
The Just Transition Fund though is not the only a mechanism to win over Eastern European states
for  the Commissions plans. The EU ETS Modernisation Fund is supposed to further deliver 14
billion euro to “address the low-carbon investments in its ten beneficiary Member States (Romania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia),” which
earlier  in the investment plan were just  described as “lower-income Member States.”348 Neither
Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, or Luxembourg are mentioned in this list, even though they, like
the  Eastern  European  countries,  are  net  beneficiaries  of  the  EU  budget.349 While  Poland  and
Hungary  are  the  main  beneficiaries,  they  are  directly  followed  by  Greece  and  Portugal,  then
Romania and then Belgium.350 This is another indicator for the transition mechanisms mainly being
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designed to buy the support of Eastern European countries. Apart from these considerations, one
might ask why Germany, the biggest economy wihtin the EU, would be in need to receive funds
from the Just Transition Mechanism or even through the cohesion projects.
To apply for the fund EU member states have to  “identify the eligible territories through dedicated
territorial  just  transition  plans,  in  dialogue  with  the  Commission  and  consistently  with  their
National Energy and Climate Plans.”351 Theoretically, every territory whose just-transition plans,
presented by their national governments, has been accepted, would receive support from the fund.352
Projects envisioned by the fund would include on the economical level efforts of diversification,
investment for new companies,  research, digitalisation, or the enhancement of the circular economy
plan.353 On the social level, support for up- and reskilling of workers would be supported, alongside
of  assistance  for  job-search.354 Lastly,  efforts  of  Land  restoration,  e.g.  the  decontamination  of
industrial sites, or reforestation, would be supported.355 The establishment of a procedure which
forces national governments to lay out plans for how they want to support specific territories in
restructuring  the  economy  while  maintaining  opportunities  and  social  security  nets,  such  as
financing efforts of reskilling workers, which have to be approved by the Commission seem like a
step into the right direction. But similar measures in the past tended to not reach the people who
were actually in need of them. Daniela Gabor, professor for economics and macro-finance at the
UWE Bristol, warns that the money might disappear into the pockets of local elites, who will funnel
money intended for transition to their business.356 She cites the case of the Valea Jiului Region in
Transylvania, were local decarbonisation firms, due to their “connections to Romania’s political
elites [...] capture[d] the “market” for reskilling services, but private investment and jobs in new
economic sectors never actually materialised.”357 As Bruegel puts it, 
“The primary target of the JTF should be, in our view, to support workers who will lose their 
jobs as a result of the decarbonisation process. This, by itself, should help the transition by 
making necessary, but intrusive, climate policies socially, and thus politically, acceptable.”358
Furthermore,  national  governments  might  find  ways  to  funnel  the  tranisition  money  either  to
persons or  to  areas,  who are central  in  ensuring their  maintenance of  power in  their  particular
countries.  It  is  therefore  encessary for  the  Commission  to  establish  strict  and efficient  control
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mechanisms  to  assure  that  the  aforementioned  misuse  of  transition  funds  will  not  occur.
Additionally,  the  “territorial  just  transition  plans”  proposed  by  the  national  governments,  the
Commissions's monetary distribution decisions, as well as the money's trajectory from the EU to
actors  within  the  regions  need to  be as  transparent  as  possible  to  further  prevent  the fund not
reaching it's designated recipients.
Concludingly, Bruegel judges the scope and size if the JTF very critically. Given it's size of 7.5
billion euro, it is unrealistic that the fund will achieve it's goal of delivering social support, aiding
land  restoration,  and  economic  revitalisation  in  territiories  affected  by  restructuring  economic
sectors damaging the environment.359 Even if through the different re-allocation mechanisms and
cohesion policies 50 billion euro would be mobilised additionally, it seems unlikely that the fund
would be able to cover these three sectors in every EU member state. But generally, it is difficult to
account  for  how much money would be needed in the coming years  for these projects,  as  the
investment plan does not provide any estimates in this regard, or a justification for the number of
7.5. billion euro at all.360 Some estimates delivered by Bruegel state that in the energy sector alone,
1.6 million jobs are at risk in the period of 2021 to 2027, which would translate to 6.7 billion euro
of funding for labour market services. Bruegel therefore suggests to limit the funds focus on social
support alone and to a lesser extend to land restoration,361 and money should rather be distributed to
certain  projects  and  not  accross  all  over  Europe.362 Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  control  what
programmes will suffer through re-allocations within the EU budget and if their original scope was
similar to the one of the JFT.363 If this was the case, the fund would be a rebranding of former
programmes.364 A question that Bruegel does not answer, or only hint at, is why this re-naming and
re-allocation takes place. Solving this issue might show, that the funds aim is not necessarily to aid
territories in alleviating “the social and economic costs of the transition to climate neutrality“. As
has  been shown,  five  countries  would  mainly benefit  through the  implementation  of  the  fund:
Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania, Germany being the outlier as a non-
Eastern European country and being a net-contributor to the EU's budget. The puntitive measure of
cutting Poland's possible funds by 50% for refusing to accept the zero emission targets, is a clear
indicator for the fund originally being aimed at convincing them to back the Commission and the
EGD. Similar considerations might have played a role in the case of the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
and Romania. In the case of Germany, the fund might be a way of stifling the entrenchment of the
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radical right-wing AfD in the emission heavy economic sectors in e.g. Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt or
Brandenburg, where the AfD threatens to overtake the CDU party, of which Ursula von der Leyen is
a member. Political considerations seem to have been the main motivator for establishing the Just
Transition Mechanism. This might also be a reason for it's small size, as this would not hurt the EU
budget too much and would be a bearable cost for other EU countries to bear. If this was the case,
then  it  does  not  matter  that  the  mechanism due to  lack  of  transparency,  size,  and  elaboration
concerning it's other two pillars, would abrely be able to achieve it's objectives, because it's actual
goal would lie in negotiations between EU member-states via budgetary measures.  
8.3 Blackrock as a Supervisor for Sustainable Finance
A final  word  on the  sustainable  invetsment  plan  has  to  be  said regarding the  plans  vision for
“Putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system“, as the way how this project will
apparently  be  realised  carries  with  it  implications  for  how  other  parts  of  the  plan  will  be
implemented.365 
The goal of implementing a sustainable financial system, according to the investment plan, lies in
putting  “in place clear long-term signals to guide investors to sustainable investment”.366 To this
end, the Commission wants to create a taxonomy, that “will determine whether an economic activity
is environmentally sustainable, based on performance criteria for its contribution to at least one of
the six environmental objectives.”367 Furthermore, 
“Companies will  need to increase their  disclosure of climate and environmental data so that
investors are fully informed about sustainable investment opportunities and can better direct their
investment in support of the Green Deal. To this end, the Commission will review the Non-
Financial Reporting Directive.”368
Leaving aside the fact that the Commission does not put it's focus on citizens gaining better access
to  information  about  companies's  sustainability,  but  investors,  the  establishment  of  a  common
taxonomy and the review of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive appear like necessary steps into
the right  direction.  The Non-Financial  Reporting  Directive establishes  what  companies  have to
disclose to the market about their activities. Eleni Choidas, currently manager of the Association for
Financial Markets in Europe, called the review of this directive  “a crucial missing piece of the





puzzle.  […]  High  quality  data  from  issuers  will  facilitate  compliance  with  the  Disclosure
Regulation and the Taxonomy by financial market players.”369 
These ideas put forward by the Commission are part of a bigger, global process where an ever
growing number of actors from the financial sector try to introduce the concept of sustainability into
banking  and  investment  procedures.370 For  this  goal,  the  implementation  of  the  so-called  ESG
principles  play a  major  role  in  guiding finance  and investment.  The principles  are  as  follows:
Environment, meaning concerns for climate change, GHG emissions, resource exploitation, waste;
Social, meaning concerns for labour conditions, health and security, employment and diversity, and
local communities; and Governance, meaning concerncs for corruption, fiscality, or taxation. 
In April 2020, the Commission announced that the world's largest investment manager Blackrock
would advise the EU on the integration of these ESG principles into the European banking sector. 371
For this service, the company's Financial Markets Advisory sector will receive 280,000€ from the
Commission.372 Blackrock  holds  shares  of  a  majority  of  globally   important  companies.373
According to  research  done  by The  Guardian,  the  investment  manager  controls  shares  valuing
around $87bn belonging to fossil fuel companies and is therefore a top-three investor in the world's
eight largest oil  companies.374 The investment manager also holds shares in nearly every major
European bank, amongst them Deutsche Bank, Santander, BNP Paribas or ING which, in turn, are
also involved in oil companies.375 If the EU was to realize it's environmental protection objectives,
these companies would face financial challenges.
By participating in  and shaping the EU's banking regulation,  the Blackrock would not only be
directly involved with the EU's legislature, but also influence the political framework in which the
companies Blackrock holds shares in act, by e.g. changing regulations on investment or lending.376
Furthermore,  Blackrock  has  quite  a  negative  track  record  regarding climate  friendly measures,
opposing 82% climate related shareholder resolutions at companies it participates in.377 As late as
September  2019,  Blackrock  supported  lobbying  efforts  to  weaken  the  EU's  regulatory  and
surpervisory work.378
Since the beginning of 2020 though, the company tried to readjust it's position, on climate change,
369 Hay, European Green Deal, p. 2.
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at least publically, by aiming to turn environmental sustainability into one of the companies cores.379
A key document in this was a letter by Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
company, citing mainly the concern of Blackrock clients for sustainability and investment into more
environmentally friendly companies.380 Does  this  mean that  Blackrock is  going to  take  a  more
environmentalist direction, that it will fulfil through the task it was granted by the EU? This can be
doubted. For one, it can be assumed that Blackrock, through it's far reaching connections, and the
publication of the Commissions EGD Investment Plant, knew that the Commission would look for
an advisor in matters of sustainable investment.  As a preparatory measure and as to justify it's
application to the public, the company might have intended to present itself as green. 
But even if one supposes that Blackrock will start following a more sustainable investment strategy
to appease it's clients, who as a driving force also should not be underestimated, this does not mean
that it will not continue to participate in environmentally damaging companies. As an investment
manager, the company can allocate funds to whichever companies it's clients prefer. Therefore, as
long as enough clients opt to invest in fossil fuel companies, Blackrock will enable them to do just
that. Additionally, the environmentally friendly economical sector, containing e.g. photovoltaic cell
production, will foreseeably grow due to the EU's plans. Thus participating in this sector would
financially be a smart choice. The question of Blackrock's position towards climate change might
therefore not be that relevant, since it's only concern is increasing their and their clients profits (as is
the  task  of  an  investment  manager).  Still  there  is  an  obvious  conflict  of  interest  regarding
Blackrock's  advisory position,  as  no  matter  if  it  holds  shares  in  environmentally  damaging  or
environmentally friendly companies, it is going to aim to strengthen the position of the enterprises it
participates  in.  If  the  Commissions  choice  of  Blackrock  is  an  indicator  of  how other  projects
envisioned  by  the  sustainable  investment  plan,  and  by  extension  the  EGD,  will  be  handled,
prospects for actually achieving the climate objectives appear negative.
8.4 Conclusion on the capacity of the “Sustainable Investment Plan”
All in all, the “Sustainable Investment Plan” fails to deliver on it's promises. It does not provide the
correct amount of additional funds needed to close the EU's investment gap for the 2030 55%
emission reduction targets, while it's proposal on closing this gap falls short of at least two trillion
euros. The promised number of one trillion euro is partly based on instances of counting money
multiple times if it is allocated to different projects, or promising funds to be new, when they are
379 Jolly, Blackrock.
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actually already part of investment programmes by the EU, and therefore would not be eligible for
closing the investment gap. For renvenus envisioned to stem from the ETS, a sufficiently high prize
for emissions is lacking. Furthermore, the EU will have to rely heavily on private investors, who it
will give guarantees paid for by public funds. This not only pose concerns of transparency, but also
of democratic control and legitimacy.  Similarily, the Just Transition Mechanism lacks in size to
fully realize it's proclaimed objectives. But since it was likely only designed to win over Eastern
European Countries, especially Poland, to support the Commission and it's goals, the issue with the
Just Transition Mechanism rather lies in the area of political maneuvering and negotiations within
the EU. As the Commission has, due to the desing of the EU and it's institutions, only a limited
frame of action regarding the MFF and the EU's annual budget, as well as political decision making,
compromises and deals constantly have to be struck between the Commission, the Council, the EP,
between  member  states,  and  between  parties  within  the  EP.  Within  this  context,  designing  an
effective policy that would have the necessary scope and would be free from one-sided concessions,
seems to be impossible.  
But even giving the Commission the benefit of a doubt in this regard, it is difficult to defend it's
decision to appoint Blackrock as a supervising institution for integrating the ESG principles into the
EU's banking sector.  Considering the company's track record in participating in many of the world's
most  pollution  heavy  economic  sectors,  it's  pledges  towards  green  investment  seem  doubtful,
which, again, leads to questioning the sincerity of the EU's sustainable investment ambitions. The
only silverlining in this matter seems to be that Blackrock only follows the principle of doing what
a majority of customers, who at the moment seem to push for more green investment. If this push is
strong enough and will not be subject to severe volatilities, remains to be seen.
9. Conclusion
In  the  introduction,  the  question  was  posed  of  how adequate  the  EGD is  in  dealing  with  the
challenges of climate change and in realizing the objectives it describes. While all in all it can be
said  that  the  deal  addresses  nearly  every  issue  that  is  relevant  to  the  debate  surrounding
environmental  protection,  the  measures  it  proposes  often  consist  of  errant  approaches,  amplify
prexisting advantages of economically dominant actors, are restricted in their functionality by the
EU's legal framework, and rely on the idea of a circular economic transformation that lacks further
research to reliably understand it as delivering further economic growth independent of resoruce
usage.  It  further  fails  to  present  a  grander  strategy  to  influcence  and  incentivise  changes  in
consumer  behaviour  towards  more  environmentally  friendly  products.  Additionally,  necessary
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funding for the deal will be insufficient on part of public actors, as well as intransparent and lacking
democratic legitimacy on part of private actors. Meanwhile promises of a “just transition” have
turned out to simply be a code for buying some countries agreement to the EGD. Since the EGD, as
of yet, is only a preliminary strategy and will be furterher expanded upon, any conclusion on the
deal can itself only be preliminary. It is uncertain, if concerncs mentioned and predictions made in
this thesis will end up as negatively as they were presented. Statistics have been cited showing that
EU countries  have  in  the  last  decades  indeed  made  steps  into  the  direction  of  environmental
protection, albeit very slowly. But if the policies proposed by the EGD, the investment plan, and the
concept of the CE are at all an indicator for future, further transformations might not occure as fast
as necessary and might disproportionately favour economically stable actors.  
For some of these shortcomings, the Commission is not at fault. As has been pointed out, important
tools of the EU for combating climate change, like the MFF, necessitate the cooperation of every
member  state  and  cannot  be  decided  upon  against  their  will.  Compromises  and  less  radical
measures are the only manner in which the Commission is able to influence European politics at all.
Additionally, EU institutions only command the competence of drafting legislature in the area of
economic, production and trade regulations, while in the area of shared and supporting competences
it heavily relies on the cooperation of political actors in the member states. Specifically the shared
competences,  encompassing  e.g.  legislature  regarding  the  environment  and  energy,  pose  a
challenge. 
How then did the Commission choose to face these very challenges to achieve its goals? To quickly
summarize  again,  the  objective  of  the  EGD  was  to  deliver  climate  neutrality  by  2050,  while
mainting a competitive and sustainable model of economic growth, designing a just transition, and
placing the EU as a global leader in climate related questions.  
One of the tools the Commission wants to utilize to descourage fossil fuel usage in the production,
transport,  and energy sector,  was a  further  extension of  the  ETS.  Revenues  of  the ETS where
promsied to  be used for  the just  transition.  As has  been pointed out,  the ETS is  currently not
fulfilling  it's  task  due  to  low,  unregulated  carbon  prices,  something  the  Commission  has  only
promised to revised in the invetsment plan. A further problem of the ETS is that it is restricted to the
EU, thus creating the “risk of carbon leakage”. The Commission wants to implement price adjusting
measures  against  this  risk,  to  raise  prices  for  products  of  uncertain  ecological  origin  produced
outside the EU, thus proposing a quasi-protectionist strategy. This might also represent a method to
ensure the competitiveness of a more strongly regulated European economy on the world market.
Related to  the question of the ETS was the reduction of  GHG emissions  in  the energy sector.
Instead of funding the expansion of renewable energy production or proposing renewable energy
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production  targets  for  the  coming  decades,  the  Commission  instead  focused  on  funding  the
renovation of buildings towards more energy efficiency to fight “energy poverty”. While this might
lower kWh prices, this strategy would mainly lead to advantages for property owners and might end
up costing people living in rental arrangements more, as renovations would give landlords a cause
to raise rents. Furthermore, these renovations might become superflous, due to urbanisation, since
especially old buildings in the countryside are more in need of renovations for energy efficiency
than modern city buildings. It should be mentioned though that the member states command a high
rate of autonomy in the energy sector and that the Commission therefore does not have many tools
to introduce a transformation in this regard. Furthermore, a lot of porgress already has been made in
the construction of renewable energy plants  during the last  decades,  though this  might  also be
related for to the geostrategical need of making Europe energy-independent from Russia or Saudi
Arabia.     
Regarding pollution in transportation, the Commission proposed to shift cargo loads towards rail-
and waterways, which would utilize electricity or biofuel. Biofuels are also presented as a viable
alternative for air-traffic. What the Commission does not mention though is that the capacity for
producing biofuels for now is far too low to cover the European fuel demand. A reduction in fossil
fuel  driven  transportation  like  aviation  to  the  advantage  of  strengthening railway networks  for
private  transport  is  not mentioned.  The EGD further  fails  to adress private  road transportation,
which makes up the majority of GHG emissions in the transport sector. Here the Commission fails
to present a strategy that will lead to the usage of more environmentally friendly vehicles. Equally,
instead of promising funding for public transport within cities, and trying to reduce private traffic in
urban areas, the EGD only mentions introducing regulations for air pollution.
In the area of alimentation, the Commission introduces a “Farm to Fork” strategy, which in the long
run is supposed to revitalize biodiversity, produce healthier eating behaviours, and turn farming in
general into a more environmentally undertaking. For this, the EU promises to fund farmers, though
a majority of funding will go to a small number of big agricultural companies, as they are the main
producers of farming products in the EU. The problem of monocultures damaging biodiversity is
not addressed wihtin the EGD. Neither are measures to further farmers resilence towards heat,
drought,  or  inundations.  Finally,  the  Commission  believes,  that  through  labeling  agricultural
products, and forcing companies to disclose more production related information on the packaging,
consumer behaviour will be sufficiently influenced to change. If consumers lack knowledge of how
to classify the given information though, these regulations would not serve the intended goal. While
directly influencing the agenda of school curricula is impossible for the EU institutions, plans for
funding educative  initiatives  could  have  been  presented.  The  only thing  the  EGD mentions  in
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regards of financially supporting education and research is connected to channeling funding towards
finding technological solutions to climate change, which in itself is necessary, but should not remain
the only option in this area, as technological progress cannot reliably predicted.
While the objective of “greening national budgets” remains highly dependent on member states
willingness to comply with climate goals, the pledge to connect EU legislature to a “green oath”
and adding memoranda to legislation that explain how laws would serve to fight climate change, is
difficult  to  evaluate.  While  the  “green  oath”  seems  more  like  a  publicity  catchphrase,  the
memoranda could serve the cause of legislative transparency. But similarily to how the “climate
pact”,  which  aims  at  cooperating  with  citizens,  NGOs  and  private  institutions  to  improve
environmental  EU  legislature,  the  effectiveness  of  these  measures  is  constricted  by  the  high
complexity of legislative texts, especially in the EU context, to the point where only legal experts
would truly be able to use these tools. 
On the world stage, the EGD envisions the EU as a “Global Leader” in fighting climate change.
Here lies the true crux of the Commissions plans: Even if Europe were to achieve climate neutrality
by 2050, this would not be enough to prevent global warming, as the majority of heavily polluting
nations are not part of the EU. Options for the EU to influence these nations are limited and it is
unpredictable of diplomacy will manage this challenge. It seems to be apparent though that through
asymmetrical trade regulations the EU aims at exploiting the African market for European investors,
possibly in  an attempt  to  further  grow European companies  and maintain  the  global  European
economic  competitiveness  under  the  condition  of  further  restrictions  related  to  environmental
protection and the transformation towards the CE. 
The“Circular Economy Action Plan”, as has been pointed out, presents sensible ideas regarding
recycling,  waste  management,  product  durability,  and general  sustainability.  Given the  growing
production of waste and demand for resources, it  is also a deeply necessary strategy. Based on
studies promising further growth regarding profits and jobs until 2030 due to a more efficient usage
of waste and resources, it seems plausible that an actual desire exists on the side of politicans and
companies to implement these very ideas. But questions remain about how combinable continued
growth  and  true  circularity  are,  since  no  studies  exist  analysing  effects  of  a  continued
transformation towards circularity past  2030. As a  closed,  circular system implies,  that nothing
would leave or enter the economic flow, further growing the economy does not appear to be a
given. Furthermore, the European economy would have to be separated from the global economy if
one would want to implement true circularity, as only then value chains and resource origins would
be possible to monitor and regulate completely As the CE action plan implies, this will not be the
strategy chosen,  the  EU will  stay connected  to  the  world  economy and  therefore  profit  from
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resource exploitation around the world, even if Europe itself turns towards a more circular model.  
For financing its climate ambitions, the Commission envisioned the “Sustainable Investment Plan”.
While the plan promises one trillion euro to close the investment gap that exists for achieving the
goal  of  reducing emissions  by 55% by 2030,  it  does  not  disclose that  this  money will  not  be
sufficient. Also, the plan only gives the numbers for necessary investments under the old reduction
condition of 40%. Additionally, the number of one trillion euro is partly reached through attributing
money of  different  EU programmes  multiple  times,  and  through  relying  on money by private
investors.  These investments would not  be subjected to rules of transparency,  public  control  or
democratic legitimacy, as would be expected for an issue that is critical to every citizens well-being.
This  problem is  amplified  by the  EU contracting  Blackrock  to  oversee  the  implementation  of
sustainable investment rules in the European banking sector, whilst the company itself has vested
interests  in influencing regulations to maximise its own and its  clients profits.  Lastly,  the “Just
Transition Mechanism”, which was promised to financially aid the economical transformation of
regions who heavily rely on fossil fuel usage, is too small in size to achieve its ambitions and
furthermore is mainly a tool to win over countries such as Poland for the EGD, or to help Ursula
von der Leyen's party in German federal states where the conservatives are politically struggling.
Concludingly, while the EGD addresses a large array of environmental challenges, though failling
to rethink processes of urbanisation, strengthening resilence towards environmental catastrophes, or
aiming to change general consumer behaviour through e.g. awareness campaigns, the deal upon
further inspection reveals a sinister set of policies, that might aid in combating climate change, but
are insufficent, either by design or through institutional restrictions, for achieving a just transition or
decoupling growth from resource usage. And while climate neutrality might be achieved by 2050,
this would probably be at the cost of continued environmental destruction around the world. 
This analysis can only be considered as preliminary though. As the issue at hand is too complex and
influenced by a too diverse number of factors and actors, predictions and conclusions made cannot
be seen as a certainty. Further research is needed in the years to come, focusing on other strategies
proposed by the Commission under  the framework of  the EGD, including analyses  of  national
legislature, regional political and environmental trends, international European diplomatic action, or
scientific studies regarding specific measures to combat climate change in certain areas. For this, a
continued effort of the European scientific community and civil society is necessary, to in the end
push for further efforts towards environmental protection, as the task is too big to be dealt with
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